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Prelude to Fratricide: The Carranza-Villa Split and 
Factionalism in the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1914. (174 
PP-) ^ jpj. 
Director: Manuel Machado 
This study examines the criticaf^^eiiady (1913-1914) of 
the Constitutionalist Revolution. It concludes that 
socio-economic differences separating Venustiano Carranza 
and Francisco "Pancho" Villa laid the groundwork for the 
ultimate factionalization of the Constitutionalist 
coalition. The study analyzes specific events of the 
revolution, expulsion of the Spanish from Chihuahua, the 
Benton Affair, the occupation of Veracruz, the Zacatecas 
campaign, and the convention of Aguascalientes, as catalysts 
for the split. 
This study relied on both United States and Mexican 
primary sources. The backbone of the American sources 
included the Records of the Department of State Relating to 
the Foreign Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929 (Record Group 59, 
National Archives, Washington D. C.) and the Papers Relating 
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914 
(Washington D. C., Government Printing Office, 1922) as well 
as The New York Times and the El Paso Herald. The Main 
Mexican Sources were Vida Nueva, the villista newspaper 
published in Chihuahua beginning in 1914, and a series of 
documents entitled Ejercito Constitucionalista Division ̂ del 
Norte: Manifesto del C. Gral Francisco Villa a la Nacion y 
Documentos que Justifican el Desconocimiento del C. 
Venustiano Carranza como "Primer Jefe de la Revolucion" 
(Chihuahua, Tipografia del Gobierno, 1914. ) The Mexican 
sources and use of the El Paso Herald resulted from a 
research trip in the summer of 1985. During the trip the 
author visited many of the northern Mexican cities prominent 
during the revolution, which greatly aided the finished 
product. 
In conclusion the study finds that Carranza must be 
assigned the majority of the blame for the split because of 
his attempt to contain Villa in the north and exclude him 
from participation in the success of the revolution. It 
does recognize that Villa did many things that antagonized 
Carranza, but Carranza, with the superior education and 
upbringing, should have foreseen the consequences of the 
split and the bloody civil war that followed. 
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Preface 
The sun beat incessantly on the Chihuahuan desert and 
the sparse ground covering radiated heat waves adding an 
unreal quality to the area. The temperature climbed past 85 
degrees by nine o'clock that morning and the air was still. 
Only the railroad tracks of the Mexican Central interrupted 
the endless stretch of wasteland. In the distance black 
smoke filled the air as a coal driven train moved its way 
south. The train itself looked unusual for a 1914 cargo 
locomotive. The fifty or so cars carried a wide variety of 
horses, some looking half starved, others like they lived on 
grain and corn. On the top of the cars sat men with guns 
and bandoleros, some full, some empty. Women and children 
rode with the men, many cooking over impromptu stoves 
affixed to the roofs. The men wore no hats that day because 
orders had come from their leader that this would be the 
signal to identify friend from foe. All told, nearly 3,000 
people, only half of them men, ready to die for the cause, 
rode this train, with five more following behind. Francisco 
"Pancho" Villa was advancing, preparing for another battle 
on his march toward Mexico City. 
The revolution, begun by Francisco Madero in November 
1910, brought to an end thirty-six years of stability in 
Mexico. The next decade saw chaos and turmoil destroy much 
of the good accomplished before the breakdown in political 
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stability. During the brief period that Villa and his 
nominal superior, Venustiano Carranza, fought Victoriano 
Huerta for control of Mexico, it seemed as if Mexico would 
once again unite on the road to peace. Yet once Villa and 
Carranza defeated their common enemy they were unable to 
reach mutually agreeable terms on what direction the future 
of Mexico should take. The result of their inability to 
come to terms in the latter months of 1914 doomed Mexico to 
another six years of violence and bloodshed. The origins of 
this split between Carranza and Villa will be investigated 
here. Personality differences compounded by the actual 
events of the Constitutionalist Revolution caused this 
split. The consequence of the split in the short term was a 
bloody civil war and in the long-term it excluded one of the 
major factions from a role in the reconstruction of Mexico. 
Social differences between Villa and Carranza 
underscored much of problem between the two men. Villa came 
from a poor peasant family while Carranza was born into 
wealth. Carranza could not forget that Villa was the same 
as any peon that worked on his hacienda, and he made sure 
Villa did not forget it either. Yet this difference in 
social background alone cannot account for the break between 
the two men in September of 1914. Once the 
Constitutionalists began to advance toward Mexico City, and 
with the defeat of Huerta, political friction exacerbated 
the tension caused by their different upbringings. 
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Moreover, prior to and during the success of the rebellion 
the two men argued over how to conduct relations with 
foreign governments. This also stemmed from their divergent 
social background because Carranza believed that Villa did 
not have the intelligence to understand foreign relations. 
Finally, as the animosity built between the two men, the 
military campaign south presented the immediate cause of the 
split. Carranza wanted to limit Villa's power in the areas 
he already controlled and ordered another general to attack 
Zacatecas. Villa believed that the conduct of war should be 
his sphere of influence and the split increasingly widened. 
Thus, friction caused by social, political and diplomatic 
causes brought about a rupture in the revolutionary 
coalition that plunged Mexico into civil war. 
Sources always present a problem for the researcher. 
This study did not differ from the norm. Yet the voluminous 
Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal 
Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929, (Record Group 59, National 
Archives, Washington D. C.), were a gold mine for the topic 
of the split between Villa and Carranza. Constantly 
preoccupied with the impending split of the 
Constitutionalist coalition, Secretary of State William 
Jennings Bryan and President Woodrow Wilson sent a variety 
of agents to Mexico to keep them informed on the course of 
the revolution. These documents were indispensable for this 
study. In the same vein, the Papers Relating to the Foreign 
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Relations of the United States 1914, (Washington D. C., 
Government Printing Office, 1922), yield a selected amount 
of information for the researcher. Not as complete as the 
State Department documents, the Foreign Relations volumes do 
provide a starting point. 
Another important source of information used in this 
study were memoirs, specifically the Memoirs of Pancho Villa 
by Martin Luis Guzman (Austin, University of Texas Press, 
1965, translated by Virginia Taylor and the original Spanish 
edition, Mexico D. F., CIA. General de Ediciones, 1951.) 
While this book must be used with care, it does provide a 
glimpse of Villa that is unavailable elsewhere. Two other 
memoirs give a more generalized view of Mexico during the 
era of the revolution. The first, A Diplomat's Wife in 
Mexico by Edith 0'Shaughnessy (New York, Harper and Brothers 
Publishers, 1916), gives an account of life in Mexico city 
from 1911 to 1914. While mostly beyond the scope of this 
study, it did greatly aid in understanding life in Mexico in 
this turbulent time. The second is John Reed's Insurgent 
Mexico (New York, D. Appleton and Co., 1914). Reed gives a 
first hand account of life with a band of villistas during 
the early period of the revolt against Huerta and helped 
form the opening paragraph of this preface. 
Contemporary articles and newspapers always provide a 
valuable source of information. This study greatly profited 
from the El Paso Herald which I was able to use as a result 
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of a research trip to Mexico in the summer of 1985. The 
index at the El Paso Public Library is one of the best that 
I have seen and made the use of the paper extremely helpful 
and easy. Vida Nueva, the villista paper published in 
Chihuahua City also proved indispensable. Begun in April 
1914, it presented a decidedly slanted view favorable to 
Villa but in the era prior to the split between Villa and 
Carranza it presented both men in a very partisan light. 
Secondary sources, while not the backbone of any study, 
provide a framework that helps establish the order of 
events. While this study used a wealth of secondary 
materials, two need specific mention. The first is Mexican 
Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years, (Charles 
Cumberland, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1972). This 
book contains a treasure of detailed information even though 
it takes a far too favorable view of Carranza. The second is 
Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's Executive 
Agents in Mexico, (Larry Hill, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State 
University Press, 1973. Emissaries deals with the United 
States' position in the revolution from the perspective of 
the agents that viewed the events of the revolution. Its 
only drawback is the lack of analysis of their performance 
in their roles in Mexico. 
A study such as this does not result from the author 
alone. Others help every step of the way. Professor Manuel 
Machado proved an invaluable asset in my work. Pointing me 
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to sources, discussing interpretations, reading and editing 
the drafts, all greatly simplified the process. Furthermore 
he provided me the chance to go to Mexico as his research 
assistant and see the country for myself. This made much of 
what I wrote more than just an abstract endeavor. Traveling 
first to Chihuahua City via El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, I saw 
much of the state that Villa controlled. Then going from 
Chihuahua to Cananea, Santa Ana, Hermosillo, and our 
destination of Guaymas, he showed me most of northern 
Sonora. I can never fully express my thanks for the 
experience this trip provided. In the course of the two 
years working together we have become more then teacher and 
student but have become friends. For this too, I thank 
him. 
Last and certainly not least I must thank my wife, 
Leslie. Putting up with my anxiety and stress while working 
on this project has made the end result all the more 
satisfying. I must also include my two daughters in my 
thanks because they can bring a smile to my face that at 
many times is missing after a long session at the 
typewriter. Thank you Molly and Jeannette, you have helped 
in ways you cannot understand. Finally, all errors in 
interpretation and fact are my own. I hope that I have been 
able to keep them to a bare minimum. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Madero's Tiger 
"Madero has unleashed a tiger; let us see if he can 
control him," purportedly said Porfirio Diaz prior to 
1 
boarding the ship that took him into exile. An era had 
ended that day in May 1911. The thirty-five year porfiriato 
(1876-1911) saw Mexico enter the modern age. Coming to 
power at the end of fifty years of political and social 
turmoil, Diaz brought political stability to Mexico. To Diaz 
and his key supporters, the cientificos, economic 
development meant progress. To insure this progress Diaz 
offered tax rebates, special concessions and a cheap, docile 
labor force to attract the foreign capital necessary to 
2 
transform Mexico. 
The origins of the Carranza-Villa split of June through 
September 1914, can be traced to the years Porfirio Diaz 
ruled Mexico (1876-1911). Villa and Carranza grew into 
manhood in this era and became the men they would be in 
1914. Villa grew up as a peon and then became the popular 
bandit. Carranza grew up in luxury and became intimately 
involved in the porfirian system. This divergence in social 
status laid the groundwork for tension during the 
Constitutionalist revolt. As Villa matured he developed a 
profound distrust for the upper-class, while Carranza took a 
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condescending attitude toward anyone from a class below 
himself. Thus the basis for the split between the two men 
can be found in the porfiriato. Then the Madero rebellion 
of 1910-1911 brought both Villa and Carranza into the 
forefront of Mexican politics. Moreover the development 
realized during the porfiriato aided the rebellion these two 
men nominally led. Not yet the leaders that they would be 
in 1913-1914, the roles Carranza and Villa played in the 
overthrow of Diaz contributed to their position after the 
fall of Madero. 
Diaz' ability to remain in office resulted from the 
influence of key groups in the society that had an interest 
in maintaining the status quo. Chief among these was the 
professional army-officer class. The army hierarchy became 
a place for social mobility in a limited sense. Open mainly 
to the upper classes, the army did allow those of the lower 
classes with ability to rise in rank. Yet the profession 
became a political arena because, except for the Apache, 
Mayan, and Yaqui Indian campaigns and various internal 
disorders, the army did little to justify its existence. 
The military lacked an effective general command structure 
and the budgeted size of the army far outdistanced the 
3 
number of men in uniform. 
General Victoriano Huerta exemplified the lower-class 
individual rising through the ranks of the porfirian army. 
Born in extreme northern Jalisco in 1854, Huerta rose 
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quickly through the ranks. He graduated from the Colegio 
Militar in 1877 and received a commission as a second 
lieutenant. In 1879 Diaz choose Huerta's plan for a Mexican 
General Staff. By 1902, Huerta had risen to the rank of 
brigadier general and general of division in 1912. One of 
the few generals with military experience since the defeat 
of the French, he served in both the Mayan and Yaqui 
campaigns as well as fighting against rebels in Guerrero, 
Sinaloa, and Tepic. A chance meeting with then Colonel 
Bernardo Reyes in 1879 gave Huerta a connection to a man who 
would eventually become Secretary of War. Yet he remained 
outside of the in-group, campaigning in the field instead of 
4 
enjoying the good life in Mexico City. 
In order to balance the political power of the 
military, Diaz assigned the bulk of the work of pacifying 
the countryside to the rurales, the rural police force. 
Originated by Benito Juarez, Diaz expanded and modernized 
this corps into an expert and feared mounted constabulary. 
By application of the ley fuga, shot while attempting 
escape, the rurales became the most feared group of men in 
Mexico. Trials for prisoners became scarce. Banditry, 
however, did not completely die out in the countryside. The 
main routes of travel did become as safe as anywhere in the 
Americas but this resulted from a heavy presence of the 
rurales. But the symbol of the rurales in their handsome 
uniforms fed the myth of stability in porfirian Mexico. 
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Banditry flourished in Mexico throughout the porfiriato. 
Diaz co-opted some of the bandits into the rurales, others 
lived the life of the outlaw. Yet the picture of Mexico 
5 
seen by the world was of a safe, secure country. 
The myth of safety drew entrepreneurs and the country 
began to expand economically. The best example of this 
growth can be seen in the construction of railroads. The 
first line in Mexico was the Mexican National Railroad 
linking Veracruz with Mexico City. A technical nightmare, 
the 420 kilometers took forty years to complete. By 1876, 
the year of completion, it was the only line in Mexico but 
the railroads in the southwestern United States were 
6 
converging on the border. 
In the next twenty years railroad construction boomed. 
The state of San Luis Potosi characterized the growth. 
Between 1880 and 1900,15,000 miles of right-of-way were 
granted in the state. Owned and financed mostly by 
foreigners, the railroad linked the silver, copper, and lead 
mines to the port of Tampico or the factories of the United 
States through Ciudad Juarez. With improved transportation, 
costs decreased, and mineral profits escalated. In the 
critical period of the Constitutionalist revolt, the rebels 
used captured railroads to transport their troops the vast 
distances between battlefields and greatly benefitted from 
this porfirian development. The railroads also provided a 
communication network because construction of telegraph 
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lines paralleled the building of the railroad. The railroad 
telegraph also played an important role in the 
Constitutionalist revolt. When the turning point in 
relations between Villa and Carranza arrived in June of 
1914, the two men spent six hours discussing the course of 
the revolution, Villa from the railroad telegraph station in 
Torre<£n and Carranza in the same office in Saltillo. In 
addition 74,254 kilometers of commercial telegraph line 
7 
covered Mexico by 1911. 
Agricultural practices gained modern expertise during 
the porfiriato. Using centralized management, irrigation, 
distribution and rotation of crops, and exploitation of 
by-products agriculture entered the scientific age. Many 
Mexican-owned enterprises passed into hands of foreigners 
willing to make the investments that would bring profits. A 
prime example of this occurred in the rich cotton region of 
La Laguna in Coahuila. The Mexican owners of the Compania de 
Tlahualilo allowed it to fall into bankruptcy. British and 
American investors bought it in 1903. Through original 
concessions the company had the right to 12 percent of the 
Nazas river. This sum jumped greatly in dry years because 
of the fixed amount represented by the percentage. In the 
dry years the company got their water first through an 
extensive canal leaving those producers down the line 
virtually dry. Branch rail lines connected the company to 
the gulf ports and the Mexican Central, which connected to 
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the United States. During the Constitutionalist revolt, 
Villa used the enormous amount of cotton grown in the area 
to help finance his army. Moreover the vast amount of land 
owned by the company underscored part of the agrarian 
8 
problem. 
The concentration of land in the hands of a few 
individuals accelerated during the porfiriato. Luis 
Terrazas in the state of Chihuahua provided the best example 
of this phenomenon. He originally gained land from those 
large landholders who supported the French in the 1860's. 
The Apache problems of the 1870-1880's caused the draining 
away of people from the state. One feature of the 
constitution of 1857 allowed the confiscation of land not in 
use. Terrazas remained in the state and used this law to 
obtain extensive amounts of land. Additionally, Terrazas 
arranged influential marriages for his children, and an 
extended net of kinship consolidated his control. He 
ultimately controlled 6.5 million acres of land in the state 
and paid almost no property taxes. This vast amount of land 
supported a huge quantity of livestock. Villa confiscated 
the land in December 1913, and used the approximately half a 
million head of Terrazas cattle to feed and finance his 
army. Yet Terrazas never wholeheartedly supported Diaz, but 
in Chihuahua he became the symbol of porfirian authority. 
9 
It took a political payoff to gain his support. 
The Mexican Constitution of 1857 underwent many changes 
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during the porfiriato. The term of office of the president 
had been extended to six years, the office of Vice-President 
was established, and unlimited re-election was instituted. 
When Diaz won the election in 1904, political and social 
tension increased. Diaz also made the mistake of growing 
old. Seventy-four in 1904, whispers began to circulate as 
to whether Diaz could live to the end of his term. If he 
did live, many believed that his choice for Vice-President 
in 1910 would become his political successor. Yet Diaz 
surprised everybody by announcing in 1908 that he would not 
seek another term and that opposition parties would be 
allowed to form. It appeared as if political power would 
10 
finally change hands. 
Political discontent gained a hold on Mexico because of 
porfirian cronyism. In many states those with economic 
power found themselves excluded from political participation 
because of porfirian support for another faction. In the 
State of Coahuila, Venustiano Carranza learned the hard way 
how the porfirian system worked. Born in 1859 and educated 
in the best Mexican schools, Carranza became involved in 
local politics in his hometown of Cuatro Ci/negas. As a 
presidio president he desired greater office but found 
himself blocked by Diaz' favorites. In 1893 he joined a 
rebellion against the porfirian governor and forced the 
latter to resign. One result of the 1893 Coahuilan revolt 
thrust Bernardo Reyes into Coahuilan politics as mediator of 
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the dispute. Carranza became one of Reyes supporters, 
representing the latter at a pro-Diaz convention in 1909. 
Following the 1893 revolt Carranza twice became Municipio 
(county) President of Cuatro Cienegas (1893-1898) and became 
a deputy to the national congress in the latter year. In 
1904 his position within the porfiriato became complete when 
he received porfirian support in his bid for National 
Senator. In 1908 he received the position as interim 
Governor of Coahuila. He then decided to run for the regular 
term in 1909, but the porfirians supported his opponent and 
11 
Carranza was thus alienated. 
In the renewed political freedom of 1908-1909, General 
Bernardo Reyes, Minister of War, became a logical choice to 
succeed Diaz. Popular with the army and some of the 
upper-class, Reyes gained the support of strong political 
clubs. His efforts constituted more of a move toward the 
Vice-Presidency than for the position as chief executive. 
But he remained loyal to Diaz and accepted a military study 
mission to Europe, a Mexican form of political exile. 
Supporters of the Flores Magon brothers revived the Mexican 
Liberal Party (PLM) but did not gather much popular support 
because their policies had drifted too far to the left. A 
group of political moderates, between Madero and the PLM 
also agitated but never actually organized. A smattering of 
other local parties also entered the political arena. Yet 
none gathered the popular appeal that Francisco Madero and 
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12 
his "Anti-reelectionist" party did. 
Madero, the son of a wealthy hacendado from the state 
of Coahuila and a success in his own right, gathered popular 
support. He sat on the board of directors of the largest 
cottonseed oil company in Mexico and spent many years 
running one of his father's haciendas. In response to the 
Creelman article, Madero published a book entitled The 
Presidental Election of 1910, written in 1908, in which he 
predicted that Diaz would in fact run again. Madero used 
this slender thread to advance his own candidacy. The 
anti-reelectionist party attributed its name to his book. 
Madero wanted political change but meant to leave it at 
that. As Madero had predicted, Diaz did reverse himself in 
13 
May 1908, and offered himself for reelection. 
As the election approached and Madero's popularity 
increased, he became a threat to porfirian interests. In 
June 1910, Diaz had Madero arrested for fermenting rebellion 
and insulting Federal authorities, thus cancelling his 
opposition. Surprising no one, Diaz easily won the 
election. Family connections allowed Madero to arrange bail 
after the election and, when free, he promptly fled Mexico, 
arriving in the United States in 1910. He finally reached 
the grudging conclusion that the only way to effect 
political change was through revolution. Thus he announced 
his plan de San Luis Potosi. In order to avoid violating the 
neutrality laws of the United States, he post-dated the 
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manifesto to his last day in Mexico. It had the desired 
effect because no charges of neutrality violations, 
attempting to overthrow a foreign government from the United 
States, were filed against him. Although he did make a 
grievous mistake, he gave the date, November 20, 1910, for 
14 
initiating hostilities. 
By giving the date to begin military action, Madero 
allowed Diaz to crack down on his opposition. When Madero 
reentered Mexico in November 1910, significant support 
t 
failed to materialize. Revolt did begin in a variety of 
places, but only in small groups. This failure to get the 
Madero rebellion going in November became the last gasp of 
the porfiriato. The use of guerrilla tactics by the rebels 
forced the Federal Army into a counter-insurgency war. The 
Federals could not stop the rebels because they found 
themselves outnumbered in most engagements and 
counter-insurgency demanded superiority. The lack of 
ammunition further hampered the defensive nature of the 
Federal campaign. Money for bullets had somehow found its 
way into the pockets of the Federal Commanders. This lack of 
munitions invariably hurt morale and led to desertion. Yet 
the widespread, regional nature of the revolution became the 
decisive factor in the overthrow of Diaz. 
Revolutionary activity began in northern Mexico prior 
to Madero's call for military action. Pascual Orozco, Jr. 
instigated guerrilla warfare in the state of Chihuahua in 
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October 1910. The son of a store owner, Orozco made his 
living driving mule teams loaded with gold and silver out of 
the Sierra Madre Mountains. When an important contract went 
to a rival, one of Diaz's favorites, Orozco went into 
rebellion. Madero co-opted Orozco's force through 
connections with Abraham Gonzalez, President of the 
chihuahuense anti-reelectionist club. This gave Madero a 
semi-independent and successful military movement in the 
16 
interior of Mexico. 
Also in Chihuahua, Francisco "Pancho" Villa joined 
Madero's rebellion. Villa, born Doroteo Arango in Durango 
in 1878, took up the trade of outlaw as a result of a 
dispute between himself and the son of the hacendado to whom 
17 
his family owed allegiance. Working primarily in the 
states of Durango and Chihuahua, Villa became a legend and a 
hero to the lower classes. The uniqueness of the north, 
especially Chihuahua, played a large part in the acquisition 
of his status. Originally settled by military colonies 
opposed to the Apaches, the chihuahuenses retained an 
independence not found in other parts of Mexico. The large 
number of wild cattle also fueled Villa's rise to fame. The 
people of Chihuahua believed that the cattle were free for 
the taking, but as the land began to be claimed by 
hacendados, the cattle became possessions. Livestock that 
once seemed part of the public domain now could only be 
taken illegally. Thus Villa the bandit became Villa the 
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hero, flaunting his skills before the porfirian 
authorities. Gonzalez recruited Villa also, offering him 
the chance to drop the outlaw trade for the legitimacy of a 
rebel. Villa recognized the fine line between bandit and 
rebel and jumped at the chance and became part of Orozco's 
18 
army. 
In the state of Morelos, a thousand miles south, 
rebellion began in 1909. Emiliano Zapata centered his 
opposition on the attempt to retain and regain land lost to 
the hacendados in the area. Taking advantage of the land 
law of 1894, the hacendados confiscated lands that had no 
clear title but had been ejido lands since before the 
arrival of Cortez. Zapata, a horse trainer on one of the 
large haciendas, became the leader of a group of local 
peasant uprisings. A breakdown in the porfirian political 
structure in the state assisted in advancing the revolt 
onward. Since the bands were made up of peasants, progress 
in the rebellion stopped when planting or harvesting time 
came. The rebellion never succeeded in moving very far 
outside Morelos but did cause an added drain of manpower 
19 
that Diaz needed in the north. 
Diaz's decision to resign came from a conscious 
reaction to the bloodshed caused by the internal strife. A 
rebel victory in early May 1911, at the important border 
city of Ciudad Juarez, led by Pascual Orozco and Francisco 
Villa, helped him reach the decision. He resigned on May 
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25, 1911, and boarded the Hamburg-American Line Steamer 
Ypiranga for exile in Europe where he died on July 2, 
^0 
1915. 
Francisco Leon de la Barra, Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, became Provisional President in May 1911, with 
elections scheduled for November. In the five months that de 
la Barra held the executive power, Madero did not force 
issues upon the interim president. This caused multiple 
problems, the most important being the open antagonism of 
Zapata. De la Barra ordered Victoriano Huerta to enter 
Morelos in August 1911 and disarm the Zapatistas. Although 
Zapata had agreed to Madero"s request to disperse his army, 
Zapata argued that some of his troops had to retain their 
arms to keep the peace in the region. This prompted de la 
Barra's order to Huerta and thus Zapata remained in 
rebellion. On November 25, 1911, four months prior to 
Orozco's repudiation of Madero, Zapata announced the famous 
Plan de Ayala which curiously enough recognized Pascual 
Orozco as leader, with the provision that if Orozco 
declined, Zapata would take control. Orozco never 
declined. In addition, the social dislocations caused by 
the revolution gave Madero multitudinous problems to face 
21 
when he came to power. 
Francisco Madero assumed the presidency of Mexico at 
the end of November 1911 following one of the freest 
elections in Mexican history. But he had little support 
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among the old ruling class, the army, the native elite, and 
the foreign capitalists. He realized that some type of 
social reform was needed but believed that political reform 
would solve all of Mexico's problems. He also antagonized 
many of the revolutionaries. Orozco became disenchanted 
with the Madero government when he did not receive an 
important position in the government. A national hero in 
the anti-Dxaz revolution, Orozco believed that he had earned 
the position of Secretary of War. His appointment as 
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commander of the Chihuahua Rurales hurt his pride. 
Madero further hurt himself by his handling of the 
Federal Army. He decided to keep the army intact and disband 
the victorious revolutionary army. His former enemies 
became the foundation of his regime. Many of the 
revolutionary heroes were forced into retirement. Francisco 
Villa, one of the heroes of the battle of Ciudad Juarez, 
retired to Chihuahua to open a butcher shop. Madero's 
action had a two-fold effect. Many of the revolutionaries 
resented Madero's overlooking them, and the career soliders 
resented the placing of revolutionaries in positions of 
importance. Thus, Madero lost the unqualified support of 
23 
the agency upon which he based his survival. 
The first serious military threat against Madero failed 
to materialize. Bernardo Reyes returned from his European 
study mission prior to the November 1911 elections. 
Although promised the portfolio of War if he did not oppose 
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Madero in the election, supporters convinced him to run. A 
roughing up by Madero supporters and a refusal by the 
Provisional Government to delay the election convinced Reyes 
that safer territory existed north of the border. Once in 
the United States, Reyes began to plot rebellion. He set 
the date to begin action for December 1 but was arrested by 
United States authorities for violation of the neutrality 
law. Before trial, though, he slipped into Mexico and 
attempted to generate support for his cause. The support 
failed to materialize. On December 25th he turned himself 
in to authorities in the state of Nuevo Leon and ultimately 
found himself in the Prision Militar de Santiago Tlaltelolco 
in Mexico City. Madero had weathered the first storm, but 
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others followed. 
Two ominous events unfolded in January 1912. The first 
resulted from a meeting between Madero and Orozco early in 
the month. What actually transpired never became public 
knowledge, but on January 26 Orozco officially tendered his 
resignation. Madero convinced Orozco that his service to 
the revolution was not yet completed and to remain at his 
post until March. The second event concerned revolts in 
favor of Emilio Vazquez G^mez. Vazquez Gomez believed that 
his brother had been unfairly treated by being dropped from 
the Madero ticket in favor of Jose Maria Pino Suarez and 
meekly called for rebellion. Feeble action did take place 
in Zacatecas, Sinaloa, and Chihuahua, but the only serious 
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episode occurred in Ciudad Juarez. An uprising by the 
garrison there caused enough concern for Madero to send the 
chief of the Chihuahua Rurales, Pascual Orozco, to quell 
it. Orozco arrived on February 3 and made two speeches that 
convinced the malcontents to surrender. The leaders were 
sent to prison in Chihuahua City and the uprising was 
25 
over. 
In late January 1912, Abraham Gonzalez, governor of 
Chihuahua and Secretary of Gobernacion, received a message 
from Francisco Villa. Villa informed Gonzales of a meeting 
that took place between the "Cientxficos" of the State and 
Pascual Orozco. Gonzalez realized that this portended 
problems and resigned his post in the Madero Government to 
resume his post as governor of Chihuahua. Orozco at barely 
30 years of age was liked by all classes in Chihuahua. The 
hacendados in the state, wishing to use his prestige, 
manipulated the seed of wounded pride to edge him toward 
rebellion. In the first days of March 1912 Orozco resigned 
his position as leader of the Chihuahua Rurales and on the 
4th he declared himself in rebellion against the Madero 
26 
Government. 
The Orozco rebellion constituted the first serious 
threat to the Madero Government. He quickly put together an 
army of 5000 men, four-fifths armed, and routed the first 
federal army he faced. He issued the mandatory plan, Plan 
Orozquista, and the principles for agrarian reform agreed 
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with all the major articles of the Plan de Ayala. Orozco 
quickly took Chihuahua City which was defended by Francisco 
Villa. Governor Gonzalez had ordered Villa and his 600 
irregulars to defend the city but was routed by Orozco on 
the outskirts of that city. The rebellion quickly gained 
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momentum. 
The most serious blow delivered to the rebellion in its 
early days came not from Mexico but from the United States. 
On March 13, 1912, President William Howard Taft declared an 
embargo on all arms deliveries to Mexico and caused rebel 
hostility toward the United States. Orozco's antagonism 
towards the United States government was such that the 
American Smelting and Refining Company found it inadvisable 
to ship industrial dynamite to Chihuahua. Arms were also 
sent to protect Americans in Veracruz, Tampico, Guaymas, and 
Guadalajara. The embargo did not include clothing, dry 
goods, hardware, or foodstuffs, but these were not what 
Orozco needed. A rebel attempt to obtain arms from Canada, 
shipped through the United States, was foiled. Ultimately 
the embargo on arms doomed the Orozco rebellion to 
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failure. 
On March 23, 1912, Orozco won a major battle outside 
the town of Rellano. This opened the route to Mexico City 
but Orozco was unable to follow up his victory because of 
limited supplies of ammunition, a direct result of the 
United States embargo. Madero responded by sending an army 
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north under the command of Victoriano Huerta. Huerta 
organized his 8000 man regular army at Torreon, and, when 
Villa arrived there, he received orders to place himself 
under Huerta's command. Huerta's forces clashed with 
Orozco's on May 22-23, again at Rellano but with the 
opposite result. The rebels were scattered by Huerta, and 
he became a national hero. Huerta then occupied the major 
Chihuahua cities and left the countryside to the rebels who 
29 
had degenerated to little more than bandits. 
One result of the Orozco rebellion did not have 
anything to do with the orozquistas. At the end of May, 
when Huerta had retired to the cities, Villa sent a message 
to Madero complaining that his commander-in-chief was not 
doing enough to stabilize conditions in the countryside. 
Huerta intercepted the message but did not take any action 
against Villa, but further problems resulted over the 
ownership of a purebred Arabian horse. After the battle of 
Rellano, in which Villa's forces acted as the vanguard, 
Villa confiscated a horse he found in Jimenez. Huerta 
ordered it returned, but Villa refused. Subsequently, he 
did not respond to an order to come to Huerta's office. 
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Thus Huerta ordered Villa's execution for insubordination. 
Villa explained that he had been suffering from a fever 
and that was why he could not come to Huerta's office. The 
guard escorting him to his execution was unwilling to 
listen. As the squad prepared him for execution Colonel 
- 24 -
Rubio Navarrete interceded in Villa's behalf. He succeeded 
in delaying the order, informed Raul Madero, the president's 
brother, and then went to see Huerta. Huerta refused to 
countermand the order, but when he received a telegram from 
President Madero, in response to a plea from his brother, he 
agreed to send Villa to Mexico City. A court martial found 
Villa guilty of insubordination, and Villa was interned in 
the same prison as Bernardo Reyes. Villa's hatred for Huerta 
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found its origins in this episode. 
The last unsuccessful rebellion occurred in October 
1912, under the command of Felix Diaz, nephew of the deposed 
dictator. Diaz captured the city of Veracruz but was unable 
to convince the commander of the Navy in the harbor nor the 
commander of the island fortress of San Juan de Ulloa to 
join him. Then instead of expanding his control to other 
cities in the State of Veracruz, he waited for a popular 
uprising to assist his cause. Federal forces crushed the 
Diaz rebellion on October 23 and captured Diaz. Many argued 
for Diaz' execution but Madero decided to spare his life and 
condemned him to prison in San Juan de Ulloa. He ultimately 
found himself in prison in Mexico City when a plan to 
liberate him from Veracruz Harbor was uncovered. Madero had 
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survived another attempt to oust him from power. 
The rebellions did have a disastrous effect on the 
economic conditions in the countryside. Vast amounts of 
land remained uncultivated and the destruction of railroad 
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and telegraph lines further hurt the economy. What little 
industry there was closed down. Of the five smelters of the 
American Smelting and Refining Company in Chihuahua, four 
remained idle. All this had a negative impact on the 
banking industry. Credit stopped. A run on the Banco 
Central, parent branch of nearly all the state banks, caused 
the collapse of many provincial banks. At least nine state 
governments were at or near bankruptcy. The national 
government also had its monetary problems. The reserves 
Madero had inherited from the Diaz regime had disappeared. 
Some of it obviously went to settle the unrest in the 
countryside, but rumor had it that much of it lined the 
pockets of Madero's relatives, who filled his government. 
The National Government needed a loan to pay the foreign 
debt that Diaz constantly met. Yet by January 1913, with no 
major rebellion against his rule, Madero seemed to be in 
33 
control of the country. 
The growth of the Mexican economy during the long 
tenure of Porfirio Diaz, while bringing urban Mexico into 
the modern world, did generate a vast degree of mainly 
middle to upper-class political discontent. By not 
fulfilling his promise to retire, Diaz helped focus the 
discontent and planted the seeds of Francisco Madero's 
triumph. Madero's problems began even before he took 
office. Rebellions against Madero seemed to dominate his 
first year in office with the inherent dislocations 
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compounding his problems. Yet as the new year of 1913 got 
underway it seemed as if Madero's government had turned back 
its most determined and capable foe. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
"A Man of Obscure Antecedents" 
The illusion of stability that seemed to mark the early 
days of 1913, masked the last gasp of the Madero regime. 
Madero had in fact unleashed forces beyond his control. 
Madero's inability to keep the revolutionary factions 
together ulimately led to his downfall. A seemingly minor 
barracks revolt brought Madero's term as President of Mexico 
to an end. His successor, General Victoriano Huerta, faced 
the same problems as Madero and Diaz. Rebellion in the north 
against Huerta caused the able general many hardships. When 
the factions that made up the northern revolt coalesced 
around Venustiano Carranza, Huerta had as his first duty as 
President the pacification of his country. The 
Constitutionalists, as Carranza's rebels became known, 
generated mass support and also the support of the United 
States and President Woodrow Wilson. But like the 
porfiriato, Madero's presidency and the early part of the 
Constitutionalist revolt led to friction between the new 
factions, namely Carranza's and Francisco Villa's. As the 
northern revolution gained momentum, so did the problem of 
holding together the new coalition. The inability of the 
coalition to remain together did not actually manifest 
itself in the first year of the rebellion. Nevertheless the 
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groundwork was there and in the second year it became 
decisive. 
With the majority of the leaders of the major 
rebellions in jail and their followers dispersed, Francisco 
Madero seemed to have the country finally headed down a 
peaceful road. Rebel activity did continue but was 
sporadic, more like an organized type of banditry. United 
States Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, continued to 
send reports that conditions would not improve, but with no 
organized rebellion ongoing against Madero, it seemed as if 
a new era had descended upon Mexico. Madero had spent almost 
the entire treasury putting down the various uprisings but 
believed he could rebuild the country. Pancho Villa did 
send word from the United States, to where he fled in 
October of 1912, to Abraham Gonzalez of a plot to overthrow 
Madero but not much was made of it. Madero believed that he 
1 
had things under control. 
On February 9, 1913, a barracks revolt began in Mexico 
City with the release of F^lix Diaz and General Bernardo 
Reyes from the Military Prison of Santiago Tlaltelolco by 
the troops of General Manuel Mondragon. The plan envisaged 
General Reyes attacking the National Palace while Diaz 
attacked the Ciudadela, Mexico City's main arsenal. Their 
efforts were only partially successful. General Reyes did 
take the National Palace but a counter-attack by General 
Lauro Villar, commander in chief of the Federal Army, drove 
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the forces of General Reyes from the palace. Both Generals 
Reyes and Villar received mortal wounds in the engagement. 
Diaz had more success. He captured the arsenal and therein 
entrenched his supporters. Madero found himself in dire 
straits. He faced a major rebellion in the capital without 
2 
a loyal commander of the military. 
Madero turned to General Victoriano Huerta to save his 
regime. Huerta had returned to the capital allegedly for 
medical treatment at the time of the Felix Diaz uprising in 
Veracruz, and Madero assigned him the responsibility of 
suppressing the revolt. Although closely linked to Reyes 
for many years, apparently Huerta was not intimately 
involved with the plot. But after the death of General 
Reyes his participation became more active. He pretended to 
besiege the arsenal but gave Diaz advanced knowledge of any 
attack. The attackers were repulsed and not coincidentally 
the troops still loyal to Madero mounted the assaults. 
3 
Madero's term in office was about to come to an end. 
United States Ambassador Wilson surpassed the bounds of 
diplomacy and became intimately involved in the overthrow of 
Madero. H. L. Wilson's first act in the struggle was to 
demand protection from Felix Diaz for foreign nationals 
because the Ciudadela was in the legation district. The 
State Department approved this action adding that it did not 
imply any recognition of the rebels' belligerency. H. L. 
Wilson went further by not actively insuring Madero's life. 
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Ambassador Wilson told Huerta that as military commander he 
must do what he thought best for Mexico. He also told many 
people that he could not interfere in the internal affairs 
of Mexico. Yet he became dramatically interventionist on 
4 
February 18. 
In a meeting at the American Embassy on the night of 
February 18, Diaz and General Huerta came to an agreement on 
the process of overthrowing Madero. On February 19, 1913, 
President Madero and Vice-President Jose Maria Pino Suarez 
wrote, "In view of the events which have occurred since 
5 
yesterday ... we formally resign our posts ..." That 
evening, following Constitutional procedure, the Secretary 
of Foreign Relations, Pierre (Pedro) Lascurain, assumed the 
presidency. He then appointed General Huerta Secretary of 
Gobernacion (Interior) the next ranking cabinet position in 
line for succession. Lascurain ended his fifty-six minute 
presidency with his resignation. Thus General Huerta became 
the Constitutional President of Mexico. Each step of the 
process received the approval of the Chamber of Deputies, 
yet at some point in the process the quorum was lost, 
casting some doubt on the legitimacy of the succession. 
6 
Moreover the story did not end with Madero's resignation. 
The topic of what to do with Madero and Pino Suarez 
dominated the discussion in a Cabinet meeting on the morning 
of February 22. The cabinet agreed that in order to maintain 
peace the president and vice-president could not be 
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released. Rodolfo Reyes believed that the two must be 
killed, but Huerta said that since he had guaranteed their 
lives his military reputation would not allow that course. 
He then left the meeting to attend to some other matter. 
Those remaining, including Felix Diaz, agreed that Madero 
and Pino Suarez must be killed and that it would have to be 
done behind Huerta's back. They formulated a plan that took 
place that night while Huerta was at a reception at the 
7 
United States Embassy. 
Late in the evening of February 22, Francisco Madero 
and Jose Maria Pino Suarez were taken from the National 
Palace and shot. The offical report of the government 
stated that while moving the president and vice-president to 
the Penitentiary, supposedly to make them more comfortable, 
the party was attacked. In the ensuing struggle Madero and 
Pino Suarez were killed. Huerta's exact role in the murders 
has yet to be substantiated, but as president he was 
responsible for the actions of his followers. Huerta lost 
any possible support for his coup with the death of Madero 
and Pino Suarez. Yet Huerta had only two choices following 
the assassinations, abandon his cabinet or accept what they 
had done. He choose the latter but there was one political 
casuality. Felix Diaz found himself outside the circle of 
8 
power. Huerta then turned to consolidating his support. 
On February 18, Huerta notified all the State Governors 
of his assumption of the executive powers. He demanded 
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immediate answers from each on whether they recognized him 
as the chief executive. Some, such as Ramon Cepeda of San 
Luis Potosi, granted him unconditional support. Others, 
such as Antonio Rivera of Veracruz, remained noncommittal. 
Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila asked for and received 
emergency powers from the State Legislature but did not 
recognize Huerta because the constitutional process had not 
yet been instituted. Yet he did not declare against Huerta, 
thus allowing negotiations to remain open. Huerta did gain 
support from a surprising source. Pascual Orozco 
immediately recognized Huerta. This had the effect of 
bringing many vacillators into Huerta's camp. For a short 
time it seemed as if it would also bring Zapata's support, 
but that hope by the new chief executive was quickly 
9 
killed. Only two governors immediately rejected Huerta's 
10 
claim to the Presidency and for different reasons. 
Governor Jos^ Maria Maytorena reported that Sonora 
remained quiet following Huerta's coup. He noted the 
possibility of recognition but also added the probability of 
revolution. The murder of Madero outraged most of Sonora, 
but Maytorena was unwilling to test the strength of the new 
government and requested sick leave. The State government 
granted his request and Maytorena left for the safety of the 
11 
United States. The Sonoran Legislature chose Ignacio 
Pesqueira as acting governor and agreed to reject Huerta's 
demand for recognition. Pesqueira then appointed Alvaro 
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Obregon as commander of the Sonoran "State Forces" in 
opposition to federal interference on state sovereignty. 
Thus they did not call themselves revolutionaries. 
Obregon's military skills came to light during the Orozco 
rebellion. This small landholder did not participate in the 
Madero rebellion but did help quell the Orozco revolt within 
Sonora. Once in the United States, Maytorena advised the 
United States Government to deny Huerta recognition. He 
also loaned Pancho Villa money to finance a planned return 
12 
to Mexico. 
Villa's Chihuahua gave a different response to Huerta's 
demand for internal recognition. Governor Abraham Gonzalez 
immediately rejected Huerta's call but was not able to carry 
out any action. He had earned the hatred of the strong 
Terrazas clan when he collected taxes for the 
undervaluations of their property. Thus he did not have the 
support of the strongest financial group in the state. On 
the twenty-second, following Madero's death, Major Jose' 
Alessio Robles threw Gonzalez into jail. General Antonio 
Rabago became interim governor and dissolved the state 
legislature on the twenty-fifth. Late in the night of March 
6, Gonzalez was taken from the Government Building and put 
on a train bound for Mexico City. That was the last that was 
ever seen of Gonzalez. With the upper-classes and the 
Federal Army in control of Chihuahua it was up to men of 
lower origins to lead the revolution, men such as Manuel 
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Chao, Tomas Urbina, and Francisco Villa. 
Villa reentered Mexico near Juarez on March 8, 1913, 
with eight men. Villa's decision to return to Mexico to 
oppose Huerta stemmed from a variety of reasons. The most 
obvious came from the fact that Huerta had ordered his 
execution in 1912. On a more subtle level, Villa's 
opposition resulted from his attitude towards Madero and 
Gonzalez. Both men treated him with respect and dignity, 
something very few from the upper-classes did. As the 
consul at Durango described him: Villa was "A man of obscure 
antecedents, of little education and less refinement 
14 
." Thus in the company of those of better breeding he felt 
inferior and when treated in a condescending manner he 
always reacted negatively. Neither Gonzalez nor Madero 
treated him that way, and this made him look up to and 
admire the two men. At Gonzalez's funeral tears rolled down 
his face as he walked beside the hearse. It was said that 
15 
"Villa was a defender of the poor and Madero's avenger." 
The man that ultimately became his nominal superior made the 
16 
mistake of treating him as something less than himself. 
At the time of Madero's resignation, Venustiano 
Carranza told Huerta; "If Senor Madero and the lawyer Pino 
Suarez have freely and spontaneously renounced their 
offices, either by weakness or cowardice, there is no 
17 
remedy; Huerta is the President of the Republic . . ." 
Carranza and Madero were never on the best of terms. Madero 
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realized Carranza's ties to Bernardo Reyes but supported him 
for the Coahuilan Governorship because he preferred a Reyist 
Carranza to any corralista, (supporters of Diaz's 
vice-presidential candidate.) At the outbreak of the 1910 
revolution Carranza delayed in joining Madero but when he 
did he armed his peons and led them into battle like a 
feudal lord. In December 1912, Carranza became involved in 
a dispute with Madero. Madero dropped the federal funds that 
paid for state troops under state control. Later in the 
same month Carranza gathered representatives of the 
governors of the states of Chihuahua, Sonora, San Luis 
Potosi, and Aguascalientes to discuss the possibility of 
rebellion. The only thing that kept Carranza loyal was the 
18 
barracks revolt in Mexico City. 
Carranza's ties to Huerta went back at least to 1893 
through their mutual mentor Bernardo Reyes. Carranza stalled 
in declaring his opposition to Huerta's coup because of the 
lack of the money with which to finance opposition. His 
state was one of those that teetered on the brink of 
bankruptcy, and he used the time to negotiate with Huerta 
for financial support. Carranza hoped to arrange for the 
federally funded state troops that Madero had discontinued. 
He also negotiated with bankers within the state for a 
loan. When Huerta denied Carranza the financial assistance 
that his own state bankers did, he openly proclaimed against 
19 
Huerta. 
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Carranza1s political outlook consisted of 19th century 
liberalism. The social reforms needed by the country were 
not that important to Carranza, but he used them to attract 
support from a broad spectrum of Mexicans. He believed that 
preservation of the Constitution of 1857 was the tantamount 
goal of the revolution against Huerta. He participated in 
the defense of the porfiriato and was a large landholder, 
aloof, cultured, and anti-clerical. He generated little 
excitement. When he boarded a train at Monterrey in July 
1914, reported the Consul at Saltillo, the crowd " . . . 
stood regarding each other with that dumb expression on 
20 
their faces like so many cattle." Carranza saw no place 
for rash confiscations of land, encouragement of labor 
unions, or factory legislation. What land he did confiscate 
went to his loyal followers as a type of payoff. Edith 
/ 
01Shaughnessy, wife of the Charge d'Affairs to Mexico City 
after June 1913, described him as physically timid, greedy, 
and quiet. Carranza viewed Villa as a good soldier but also 
as an ignorant peasant and treated him that way. But in 
21 
March 1913, none of this had yet manifested itself. 
One month after Madero's death the revolution gained 
increasing momentum. Villa quickly recruited 600 men. 
Toribio Ortega threatened Ojinaga. Rosalio Hernandez and 
Tomas Urbina harassed southeastern Chihuahua. Manuel Chao 
attacked Parral and Maclovio Herrera captured Namiquipa. 
They quickly forced the federales into defense of the major 
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cities, but the armies were still small and scattered, 
limited to guerrilla fighting. Still they quickly forced 
the federales to defend the major cities. Carranza 
attempted to take Saltillo, capital of Coahuila, but was 
beaten back. On March 26, 1913, Carranza announced the Plan 
de Guadalupe. Basically, it withdrew recognition from Huerta 
and those governors who recognized the new chief executive. 
Additionally, it named Carranza as First Chief of the 
rebels, calling themselves "Constitutionalists." All in all, 
it represented a very watered down platform with little 
mention of specifics. Yet it set the original goals of the 
22 
Constitutionalist revolution. 
In April 1913 the governors of Coahuila and Sonora and 
the rebels of Chihuahua met in Monclova, Coahuila, to 
discuss joint military action against Huerta. The two 
governors, Carranza and Pesqueira, agreed to accept the Plan 
de Guadalupe as the goal of the revolution. The Coahuila 
Legislature approved this action immediately while the 
Sonoran Legislature debated the issue until that summer, 
when they finally gave their consent. Villa and the 
chihuahuense rebels moved more slowly. Villa reluctantly 
agreed to recognize the plan and Carranza as First Chief but 
made it understood that he would retain control of 
Chihuahuan issues. Carranza put further pressure on Huerta 
and his supporters in May by reinvoking Juarez's Law of 
January of 1862. That law made it illegal for Mexicans, upon 
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the pain of death, to assist the French. Carranza applied it 
to all supporters of Huerta. Thus the north, united in its 
opposition to Huerta, had given the new president cause for 
worry. Huerta had further preoccupations because less than 
a month after the death of Madero a moralistic Princeton 
Professor and Governor of New Jersey was elected as the 
23 
twenty-eighth President of the United States. 
The murder of Madero horrified Woodrow Wilson, and his 
advisors assured him that Huerta was intimately involved in 
the crime. Wilson believed that General Huerta usurped 
political power unconstitutionally. Thus, he summed up his 
policy in Mexico as: "Every phase of the Mexican situation 
is based on the condition that those in de facto control of 
the government must be relieved of that control before 
24 
Mexico can realize her Manifest Destiny." Wilson asserted 
that the United States had the right to test the legitimacy 
of any government in Latin America, and Huerta did not pass 
the test. Wilson believed that Huerta assumed power through 
force and any government that came to power in such a 
fashion had to be oppressive. Wilson refused to see the 
capable men in Huerta"s cabinet, and, as time went on, 
Huerta instituted more reforms then either Madero before him 
or Carranza after him. Wilson, not trusting the 
professional diplomats that formed the consular service, 
instituted a seldom used type of diplomacy, the Executive 
25 
Agent. 
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Wilson and his new Secretary of State, William Jennings 
Bryan, looked upon the State Department staff as 
charlatans. Theodore Roosevelt had done away with the 
spoils system in 1906 by placing all ministers except 
Ambassadors on a civil service system. Taft continued the 
policy by establishing a Bureau of Appointments to review 
applications and give exams for diplomatic posts. Wilson 
and his Secretary did not trust the "Republicans" that came 
to dominate the foreign service. Thus he revived the seldom 
used Executive Agent. Many of Wilson's Mexican Executive 
Agents possessed talent, but most of these "deserving 
Democrats" did not speak Spanish and knew next to nothing 
about Mexico. Yet from their reports the new president 
26 
formed his policy towards Mexico. 
Wilson studied the situation and sent a variety of 
agents to Mexico. He announced his policy in Mexico in an 
address to Congress in August 1913. The president urged all 
Americans to leave Mexico because of the political 
instability. He said "while we wait" the United States 
would diligently watch the Mexican situation. He continued 
the arms embargo and would not recognize any government in 
Mexico. He refused to take sides or be an umpire between the 
two sides. The United States Government would practice 
infinite patience in the ongoing struggles. The press had a 
field day with the president's policy dubbing it "Watchful 
Waiting," and throughout 1913 he followed his designated 
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course. 
By September 1913, the revolution in Chihuahua had 
begun to be much more professional. On September 29, Tomas 
Urbina, Maclovio Herrera, Calixto Contreras, Aguirre 
Benavides, Benjamin Yuciar, Juan Garcia, Juan Medina, and 
Francisco Villa agreed that their forces must join together 
under a unified command structure. The caudillos finally 
decided upon Villa as their overall leader and Medina, a 
former Federal commander, drew up a command structure based 
2 8  
on division size. The Division del Norte was born. 
Villa moved immediately, and on October 1, 1913, 
Torreon fell to the rebels for the first time. The fall of 
Torreon had two effects. First it gave Villa a vast amount 
of munitions but more importantly train engines and rolling 
stock. Because Villa could not obtain arms and munitions 
from the United States, due to the arms embargo/he needed to 
get them from the federales. Torreon held a vast supply of 
arms due to its strategic location. Villa and his followers 
now had the ability to travel in style. Secondly, it had a 
profound effect on the Federals. It precipitated the 
dissolution of the National Legislature, elected at the same 
29 
time as Madero, on October 11, 1913. 
What looked like a collapse in Federal ability to wage 
war, quickly turned around. On October 12, 1913, Sir Lionel 
Carden of Great Britain presented his credentials to 
officials of the Huerta government. The rest of Europe 
- 46 -
followed suit. Huerta now had de facto recognition for his 
government because British custom recognized any de facto 
government. Huerta's fortunes also changed in Torreon. 
After the Division del Norte's victory at that important 
railroad junction, Villa left a poorly armed garrison and 
moved north. He thereby allowed the huertistas to re-occupy 
this important railroad junction with little effort. Yet 
3 0  
Villa was not yet done within the State. 
Villa now readied his troops for the taking of the 
State of Chihuahua. On November 5, 1913 he threw his entire 
division against Ciudad Chihuahua. The well-entrenched 
Federals and colorados repulsed the rebels for two days. On 
7 November Villa disengaged from the attack and retreated 
south because of dwindling supplies of ammunition. There he 
planned his most spectacular raid of the rebellion. On 13 
November he moved 2000 of his army around Chihuahua under 
the cover of darkness and ambushed a coal train from Ciudad 
Juarez. He then forced the federal telegrapher to contact 
Juarez and report that the track was destroyed and that he 
could see a dust cloud, possibly made by the rebels. The 
reply ordered the train to return to Juirez. Villa loaded 
the train with his men and the train covertly brought his 
force across the Federal lines into Juarez. The Federal 
garrison surrendered on the fifteenth without firing a 
shot. Villa once again had captured Mexico's main port of 
31 
entry. 
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The Federal commander in Chihuahua, General Salvador 
Mercado, responded immediately. At dawn on 23 November the 
forces of Huerta under the command of Mercado and the rebel 
forces under Villa met in battle at Tierra Blanca, between 
Juarez and Chihuahua. For two days they fought to a 
standstill. On the twenty-fifth Villa ordered his center to 
pull back and Mercado responded by ordering his infantry to 
follow up this seemingly rebel weakness. Villa was ready 
with a massed cavalry charge and when the Federals 
overextended themselves, Villa smashed through the enemy 
line. The rout was on. The Federals retreated to Chihuahua 
and then continued northeast to Ojinaga, on the United 
States-Mexican border. One of the civilians to run to 
Ojinaga with Mercado was Luis Terrazas. The once most 
powerful man in Chihuahua crossed into the United States and 
passed the rest of the revolution in El Paso, Texas. On 
January 10, 1914, Villa smashed the last remaining Federal 
outpost at Ojinaga, again with a massed cavalry charge. The 
whole state of Chihuahua now belonged to the former cattle 
32 
rustler. 
On December 21, 1913, after the Division del Norte took 
possession of Ciudad Chihuahua, State capital of Chihuahua, 
Generals Maclovio Herrera, Jose Rodriguez and Manuel Chao 
named Francisco Villa civilian governor of Chihuahua. For 
military reasons, they allowed Villa to be absent as much as 
necessary. Villa's contemporaries viewed him in a variety 
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of ways. Clarence Barrows, dean of the Graduate School of 
Social Sciences at the University of California at Berkley, 
said of Villa: "In my opinion he is the most temperate and 
33 
reasonable leader in Mexico." Alvaro Obregon, however, 
described Villa as "a man who has trouble controlling his 
34 
nerves." ObregcSn's view probably fit closer to the actual 
Villa. Yet both views had a ring of truth. Villa could be 
both "temperate" and very emotional. Yet whatever his 
actual makeup consisted of he did have his hands full when 
35 
elected governor. 
While lacking formal education, Villa was not a simple 
man. He commanded and supplied a large army while 
administering civilian matters within Chihuahua. He had no 
agrarian policy but was familiar with the United State's 
system of giving Civil War Veterans land. He wished to do 
the same for his followers. Villa did confiscate the lands 
of the Terrazas' and their hangers-on but only to stop the 
oligarchy from launching a counter-revolution. The 
confiscations had the short term effect of producing 
operating funds and in the long run it held out the promise 
of land for the peasants. Unemployment in Chihuahua was 
minimal largely because the army supplied a large number of 
jobs. But Villa also ordered a cut in the price of meat and 
even ran a state operated butcher shop. Only when he ran 
short on funds did he print his own money, but as long as he 
was victorious on the battlefield, the money retained its 
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value. The civilian workings of government ran fairly 
36 
smoothly during Villa's administration. 
Villa's supremacy within Chihuahua also carried over 
into Federal functions. This brought him into conflict with 
Venustiano Carranza, First Chief of the Constitutionalist 
forces. Carranza believed that his was a legal government 
and that all matters of a federal nature fell within his 
jurisdiction. In December 1913, the El Paso Herald reported 
that Carranza would move his headquarters to Juirez or 
Chihuahua. He had moved it to Hermosillo, Sonora, in August 
1913, because of rebel losses in Coahuila. The First Chief, 
however, decided against the move because the trip would 
take months unless he went through the United States, and he 
refused to leave Mexico. Both leaders still saw Huerta as 
the primary enemy. Villa's victories on the battlefield 
also forced Carranza to tolerate the former bandit. Yet 
events slowly moved to a point where the two men came to 
hate each other. In 1913, however, Federal rumors of a 
37 
split between Villa and Carranza were premature. 
Victoriano Huerta came to power in Mexico through a 
typical Latin American style coup. Yet in the process he 
created a martyr in Madero. Opposition to his regime started 
almost immediately. In the north men like Alvaro Obregon, 
Venustiano Carranza, and Francisco Villa took up arms 
against the new president. Victories came slowly for the 
rebels, but as 1913 came to an end, Villa began to steamroll 
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south from Chihuahua. A further setback to the new regime 
came from north of the border in the form of President 
Woodrow Wilson. His policy of "Watchful Waiting," passive in 
1913, became more aggressive in 1914. Tension between Villa 
and Carranza, while still mild in 1913, was threatening to 
become worse. In 1914 a bloody split between the two men 
plunged Mexico into a bitter civil war. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Murder in Juarez 
"You have made a mistake in addressing representations 
in the Benton case to General Villa. They should be 
addressed to me as First Chief of the revolution and head of 
the Provisional Constitutionalist Government," said 
Venustiano Carranza on February 26, 1914 in response to 
Secretry of State William Jennings Bryan's request to send a 
medical commission to Chihuahua to examine the corpse of the 
1 
murdered British citizen William S. Benton. Secretary Bryan 
decided not to put much credence on this stand by the First 
Chief of the Constitutionalist Forces and went ahead with 
the planned commission. Francisco Villa, to whom many had 
assigned guilt in the murder, had invited the United States 
to form the commission to establish the actual cause of 
Benton's death. This difference in opinion between the 
leader of the anti-Huerta coalition and his most successful 
general became the first in a series of events that led to a 
2 
split in the revolutionary ranks. 
In the development of the split between Venustiano 
Carranza and Francisco Villa, the first noticeable signs 
appeared in each man's dealings with foreign citizens. 
Carranza believed that as First Chief, he alone should 
decide the attitude the revolutionaries took towards foreign 
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governments. Yet he found himself taking a secondary 
position to Villa. Because of Villa's supremacy within the 
state of Chihuahua, he had taken it upon himself to deal 
with foreigners in disputes that had local origins. Thus, 
two separate foreign policies, often conflicting, emanated 
from Mexico. Villa vented his rage on Spanish citizens 
living in Mexico, because he believed they aided Huerta. 
Carranza publically supported Villa but privately undertook 
measures that undermined Villa's actions. The international 
controversy surrounding the death of William S. Benton in 
Chihuahua again underscored the different attitudes each man 
had in foreign policy. In order to court support from the 
United States, Villa was willing to bend over backwards to 
fulfill that country's wishes, while Carranza refused to 
allow the United States any special position within Mexico. 
Thus the first sign of animosity between Carranza and Villa 
came over foreign affairs in general and the Benton case in 
particular. 
The confiscation of Benton's ranch by the Mexican 
Revolutionary leader Francisco "Pancho" Villa tormented the 
Englishman. He had lived prosperously in Mexico for over 
twenty years. Now he had nothing. He decided to confront 
Villa and salvage what he could. On the morning of February 
17, 1914 he crossed the international border from El Paso, 
Texas to Ciudad Juarez, Mexico intending to demand that 
Villa allow him to bring his cattle out of the country. On 
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his way to Villa's Juarez home and headquarters, he met 
Gustav Bauch, an American railroad engineer of German 
parents. Bauch also planned to see Villa in order to vent 
concerns of his own. When the two men arrived at Villa's 
office, the soldier guarding the door entered to announce 
them. Benton, a slender, muscular man of forty-five, with a 
military bearing and carrying a gun, pushed his way past the 
guard and immediately began complaining to Villa about the 
confiscation of his ranch. Bauch, caught off guard by 
3 
Benton's sudden action, remained in the hall. 
Benton's ranch, Los Remedios near Santa Rosalia, 
Chihuahua, amounted to some 100,000 acres. The land alone 
carried a value of 250,000 dollars. Benton, known as a 
hot-headed, impulsive Scotsman, thought that as a foreigner 
in Mexico his property should remain exempt from any 
privations imposed by the revolutionaries. Villa charged 
that during the porfiriato (1876-1911) Benton had committed 
many crimes against the people of Mexico and had ordered Los 
Remedios confiscated. The discussion quickly turned into an 
argument with both men throwing ugly Spanish epithets back 
and forth. Finally Benton called Villa a cattle thief and 
the leader of a band of outlaws and desperados. Villa 
replied: "So you dare to tell me that I am a thief? A 
cattle rustler?" Villa, infamous for his sudden and violent 
temper, flew into a rage. He told Benton that he had no 
rights in Mexico and that his welcome in the country had 
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ended. 
What happened next remains debatable. Two conflicting 
versions have Benton pushed beyond endurance by Villa's 
outburst and grabbing for his gun. At this point the 
stories diverge. The first went: Unknown to Benton, hidden 
behind a curtain lurked Rodolfo Fierro, Villa's personal 
body guard. When he saw Benton reach for his gun he rushed 
from his hiding place and plunged a knife into Benton's 
back, killing the enraged Scotsman. The conflicting version 
has Villa disarming Benton when the latter reached for his 
gun. Villa then ordered Fierro to take Benton to Samalayuca 
and execute the Scotsman by firing squad. Once in the sand 
hills surrounding the small village that made up that train 
stop on the Mexican Central Railroad, Fierro had the firing 
squad dig a grave. Benton requested that the grave be dug 
deeply in order to keep the coyotes from chewing up his 
body, fierro consented and when the condemned Scotsman 
moved closer to inspect the proceedings, Fierro shot him in 
the head. In either case Benton's death caused an 
6 
international incident. 
The whole incident occurred before witnesses and took 
no longer then ten minutes. Those present included two of 
Villa's men, Gabino Vizcarra, head of the Constitutionalist 
Financial agency in El Paso, Andres Frias, an employee of 
the same agency, a woman, and her daughter. Almost 
instantly, Villa knew that he had to manufacture a cover-up 
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to protect his comrade. He also realized that witnesses 
proved troublesome. He trusted his men. He shipped the 
woman and her daughter to the interior of Mexico. This left 
7 
only Gustav Bauch waiting in the hall. 
With Benton either dead or unconscious, Villa and his 
men planned their course of action, and the sudden silence 
made Bauch suspicious. When Benton did not come out of the 
room, Bauch asked the guard what had become of his 
companion. The guard went into the office and soon 
thereafter Fierro came out and told Bauch that Benton was 
not there. Fierro then arrested Bauch in order to suppress 
% 
the true story. Reportedly, that night Villa blocked off 
the streets near his home and burned Benton's body. The 
streets remained closed for many days to keep anyone from 
smelling the lingering, putrid odor of burnt flesh. Though 
Villa no longer had to worry about Benton's body, Bauch 
8 
still remained a problem. 
The next day rumors of Benton's disappearance began to 
circulate around El Paso. The United States Consul to Ciudad 
Juarez, Thomas Edwards, told a reporter that he had heard 
nothing about Benton, but did have news of an American 
arrested by the rebels. Edwards visited Gustav Bauch in 
jail earlier that day. He did not speak to Bauch because 
s 
the Constitutionalists held him incommunicado.! The Chief of 
the Rebel Secret Service explained to the Consul that this 
followed common procedure. He added that Bauch*s arrest 
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stemmed from finding Federal papers on him that proved him a 
huertista spy. He claimed that the arrest had taken place 
on the fifteenth. Yet Edwards could not find any 
9 
Constitutionalist official to explain the charges. 
On the nineteenth Mrs. Benton, herself a Mexican 
citizen, and several influential friends asked George 
Carothers, one of President Wilson's special agents to 
Mexico, to inquire into the circumstances of Benton's 
arrest. Carothers went to Villa and asked him about the 
charges against Benton. Villa affirmed Benton's arrest and 
assured Carothers of the prisoner's safety. He stated that 
Benton had pulled a gun on him and that he would be tried by 
a court-martial. Carothers told Villa that if a fair trial 
with the necessary documents found Benton guilty then he 
could remain confident with any verdict. Carothers returned 
to El Paso and informed Mrs. Benton of his findings. In 
response to an order from Secretary of State Bryan seeking 
information on Benton, Carothers telegraphed the Secretary 
his report of Benton's incarceration. The State Department 
released Carothers' findings to the press and the matter 
10 
seemed about to conclude quietly. 
Yet the Benton affair was to cause greater problems 
than Villa imagined. When Carothers left, Villa suddenly 
realized that he would have to manufacture official papers 
for Benton's death. He also realized that Bauch could 
expose him. As he pondered what to do with Bauch, he set 
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his advisors to work concocting the court-martial. He 
decided to leave for Chihuahua the next day, telling the 
press only that he had to prepare for his army's advance on 
Torreon. At the same time he saw the chance to put some 
distance between himself and the center of the dispute. A 
slight hitch developed in the preparation of a posthumous 
case against Benton when the villistas could not find a copy 
of Benton's signature. They decided to resolve this 
difficulty the next day by going to Santa Rosalia, outside 
of Chihuahua on the Kansas City, Mexico and Orient Railroad, 
where they could obtain a copy of Benton's original 
complaint about stolen cattle. Next the villistas needed to 
execute Benton officially. But Benton's death complicated 
the matter. They solved this problem and the problem of 
Bauch in one motion. Along the way to Chihuahua the 
villistas would execute Bauch in Benton's place. With his 
, 11 
course set, Villa prepared for his exodus from Juarez. 
The first report of Benton's disappearence appeared in 
The New York Times on February 19, 1914. The report stated 
that Benton's arrest resulted from his alleged association 
with a filibuster movement that attempted to cross into 
Mexico on the seventeenth. When pressed by a reporter, 
Villa admitted that Benton was in his custody. He added, 
"What would you think of a man who came to see me and 
12 
threatened me with a big six-shooter?" One of his 
followers said that he should be shot. Villa disclosed that 
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the gun was in his possession. This report did not 
acknowledge the death of Benton, but the Scotsman's 
13 
disappearance concerned his Mexican wife. 
On the nineteenth of February the British Foreign 
Office, still believing Benton alive, set in motion an 
attempt to save his life. Mrs. Benton initiated this effort 
when she cabled the British Ambassador to the United States, 
Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, to find out what had happened to her 
husband. Spring-Rice contacted Secretary of State Bryan, 
who in turn, instructed the American Consul at Juarez, 
Thomas Edwards, and Special Agent George Carothers to look 
into the matter. Edwards met with Villa some time after the 
latter had met with Carothers. Villa told Edwards that 
Benton came to his home to kill him. He showed the consul 
the gun. Villa then claimed that Benton died on the 
seventeenth at the hands of a firing squad. Edwards 
returned to El Paso and wired his findings to the State 
Department. But the Department decided not to give the press 
this new information. Relying on Carothers' report, The New 
York Times reported on the twentieth that, although in jail, 
Benton was still alive. Yet the El Paso Herald reported 
that Mrs. Benton, while hopeful, believed that her husband 
was dead. On the twenty-first The New York Times reported 
Villa sayings "He [Benton] died the night of the same 
14 
day." 
This revelation put the American government in a 
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difficult position. To the world it looked like the United 
States had tried to help cover-up Benton's death. Villa now 
admitted that when he told Carothers that Benton was in 
jail, he had already been executed. The State Department's 
refusal to release the information that it received from 
Consul Edwards cast a bad light on the United States. Upon 
request of the Department, Villa agreed to mark the grave so 
that it could be relocated. Moreover, reported Villa, the 
location of the American Bauch was now unknown. He 
professed that he believed the latter had escaped and would 
show up shortly. Yet Benton's British citizenship 
15 
complicated the matter. 
The American Ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Hines 
Page, summed up the British attitude: "Kill an Englishman at 
home and there is no undue excitement. But kill one abroad, 
and gun-boats and armies and reparation are at once thought 
about - a state of mind that English rule in India & [sic] 
in other far-off foreign lands has made necessary till it 
16 
has become instinctive." The official view of the British 
Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, agreed with Secretary 
Bryan: if proof of Benton's military execution was 
forthcoming, then the British could only object to the speed 
in which it was carried out. Many British journals reported 
that Great Britain would discontinue supporting Wilson's 
policy of "Watchful Waiting." British public opinion, 
reported the London Sunday Times, held that the United 
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States must uphold the Monroe Doctrine and that the 
obligation was greater in this instance because the United 
States tacitly supported the faction that committed the 
crime. Commenting on the case before Parliament, Grey said: 
I should like to add that the fact that we 
are communicating with the United States does not, 
of course, imply that they have any responsibility 
for what has taken place; the communications have 
been made because the United States alone can, in 
this instance, exercise any influe4S5e to discover 
the truth and to get justice done.4-7 
Grey added that he would stay in touch with the British 
Ambassador to the United States to see what further steps 
18 
the United States would take. 
Yet the British press did not allow the matter to 
subside. The protection of English citizens abroad became 
the major topic in British newspapers. As Edith 
0'Shaughnessy, wife of the United States Charg^ d'Affaires 
in Mexico City, put it: "A life is worth a life, perhaps, 
before God; but down here the murder of a wealthy British 
subject is of more account than that of some poor American 
19 
or a thousand Mexicans." The London Daily Mail 
editorialized: "How long, may we ask, does the President of 
the United States propose to allow Mexico to flounder in her 
20 
present morass of anarchy." The London Times reported that 
Benton's death showed Villa as nothing more then a 
21 
hot-tempered bandit. 
On the nineteenth of February, when Villa first told 
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Consul Edwards of Benton's death, the Consul requested that 
the remains be released to Mrs. Benton for proper burial. 
Villa refused to give up the body, even at the risk of 
offending the United States. Because most of his munitions 
came from north of the border, Villa realized that the 
United States held the key to a successful conclusion to the 
revolution. He knew that the United States wanted to 
examine the body to try to establish the actual method of 
death. Yet he could not risk an autopsy because it would 
22 
prove that Benton did not die in the way he claimed. 
Villa left for Chihuahua on the twentieth with Gustav 
Bauch and all those on his staff with any knowledge of the 
Benton case. The rebels reported that the German-American 
would stand trial in Chihuahua as a huertista spy. Edwards 
believed that Bauch did not go south with Villa, but when 
friends went to see the alleged spy in the Juarez jail, he 
was not there. One of the prisoners that went south with 
Villa, Reyes Chavez, claimed upon his release that the train 
23 
stopped at Samalayuca and there Bauch was executed. 
On the twenty-third of February Mrs. Benton cabled the 
British Ambassador and requested his assistance in obtaining 
the remains of her husband. Secretary Bryan, responding to 
the request from Spring-Rice, instructed George Carothers to 
ask Villa to release Benton's body to the British 
Government. Villa refused. Carothers then told Villa that 
if he would allow an independent medical team to examine 
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Benton's corpse then they could establish the actual cause 
of death. Villa agreed to take the recommendation under 
consideration. His refusal to give up the body stemmed from 
the fact that he could no longer deliver it. Yet he 
incorrectly believed that if he waited long enough, he could 
deliver Bauch's body instead, thinking decay would make 
identification impossible. On February twenty-sixth he 
proposed that the United States send a team of doctors to 
Chihuahua to examine the body. The United States agreed and 
put together a medical team that included James Hambleton, a 
British doctor, and Charles Perceval, British Consul to 
Galveston, Texas. On May first the team prepared to board a 
24 
special train provided by Villa for the trip to Chihuahua. 
At this point the whole affair changed from Villa's 
problem to Carranza's. Bryan cabled Carranza on the 
twenty-sixth and told the Constitutionalist leader of his 
intention of sending a medical commission to Chihuahua. 
Carranza responded that this was the first time that the 
incident had been relayed through the proper diplomatic 
channels, and for that reason he felt no prior need to 
comment on the issue. He informed the United States 
government that, as head of the Constitutionalist movement, 
any diplomatic matters should be brought to his attention 
and not to one of his field commanders, implying that the 
commission did not have his acceptence. But the State 
Department did not put much credence on this position and 
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went ahead with the planned commission. When the medical 
team arrived in Juarez on the first of March, Carranza's 
25 
agents ordered them back to El Paso. 
Previously Carranza had allowed Villa to make his own 
mistakes in dealing with foreign governments. Villa's 
attitude toward the Spanish constituted the best example. 
Villa believed that the Spanish assisted the huertista 
forces and that made them his enemies. The Spaniards in 
Chihuahua had millions of dollars of property and were the 
primary owners of mercantile establishments and pawn shops. 
When Villa entered Ciudad Chihuahua in December 1913, he 
gave all Spanish citizens five days to leave Mexico with the 
penalty of death to those that did not comply. On 8 
December he extended the time limit to ten days because of 
the great number of Spanish in Chihuahua. The Spanish in 
that city were some of the wealthiest in the country, and 
26 
Villa ordered them all to leave without their property. 
On the thirteenth of December nearly five hundred 
Spanish citizens arrived in El Paso, Texas, from Chihuahua 
in a special train provided by Villa. On the seventeenth of 
December a second train with more then five hundred Spanish 
and American citizens left Chihuahua. Villa forced many of 
the wealthy Spaniards to pay a ransom in order to leave the 
country. He took the Luis Siqueiros family from the train 
and forced them to pay 5,000 dollars before being allowed 
back on the train. The Spanish in Monterrey also prepared 
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to leave northern Mexico in fear of that city's fall to the 
27 
rebels. 
On February 3, 1914, Villa issued a warning that all 
Spanish in Torreon would be dealt with immediately following 
the capture of that city. If he found proof that they aided 
the Federal forces the result would be death; otherwise they 
would be banished. He believed that all the Spaniards in 
Torreon were armed and in that case, if captured, they would 
be shot. Villa divided all foreigners into three classes. 
The first were United States citizens who had no 
restrictions on their business activities in villista-held 
territory. The second group included all other foreigners 
except the Spanish. This group was forced to pay to do 
business in Chihuahua. The Spanish constituted the third 
group. Villa considered Spanish property booty of war and 
28 
used it for his own purposes. 
Villa confiscated three wholesale warehouses owned by 
the Spaniards Manuel and Domingo Trueba and E. Canalles in 
Juarez. This gave him thousands of dollars of stock, 
groceries, and clothing. When he seized the store El Nuevo 
Mundo from Spanish owners he sold its stock of shoes at half 
their listed price and sugar that brought thirty-five cents 
was let go for twenty. Following the capture of Torreon in 
April 1914, Villa shipped 407 railroad cars of cotton from 
the Laguna district. Aside from 12 carloads of United 
States and British cotton the rest was confiscated Spanish 
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cotton. Spanish refugees held some of it up, but the 
majority was ready for resale at forty dollars a bale or a 
total in excess of 800,000 dollars. While the United States 
government tried to bring pressure against Villa to relax 
his attitude towards the Spanish, Villa continued to be 
29 
uncompromising. His position was reinforced by Carranza. 
Carranza believed that the report of Spanish 
mistreatment was overblown. He argued that Villa only 
expelled those Spaniard merchants and priests that actively 
supported Huerta. He reported that the action was authorized 
by the re-instatement of the January 25, 1862 decree, which 
allowed the execution of any citizen of Mexico that aided 
Huerta. Yet privately Carranza worked to undermine Villa's 
position with regard to the Spaniards. He began to grant 
citizenship to those Spaniards requesting it and allowed 
them to return to Mexico and guaranteed their property 
rights. Villa's actions towards the Spanish forced Carranza 
into a position that he may not have taken. Again in the 
Benton Affair, Villa's actions forced Carranza to settle 
another diplomatic dispute. With the success of the 
revolution and Villa's constant difficulties with other 
governments, Carranza was forced to attempt to control the 
30 
leader of the Northern Division. 
On the twenty-seventh of February 1914, when Villa 
informed Carranza that he had invited a medical team to 
examine Benton's body, Carranza ordered that he discontinue 
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any discussions with the United States. Villa readily 
agreed. Carranza also saw a chance to pressure Britain into 
withdrawing its de facto recognition of the Huerta 
government. Moreover Carranza denied the United States the 
right to concern itself with a matter dealing with a citizen 
from another country. He argued that only the home country 
through its official representatives could conduct 
negotiations. When a reporter asked Carranza if he 
recognized the United States as champion of all foreigners 
in Mexico, the First Chief refused to answer. He made it 
clear that if the British wanted to inquire into the Benton 
31 
incident, then they should do it through proper channels. 
That such channels did not exist overtly pointed to 
Carranza's diplomatic maneuvering. Carranza took this 
position for three reasons. First, he hoped to force Great 
Britain into de facto recognition of his government. 
Second, he could not afford to appear like an American 
puppet to his people. Third, he wanted to avoid any Mexican 
recognition of the Monroe Doctrine, which he believed 
implied a loss of sovereignty. He announced that he would 
appoint a commission to investigate the death and agreed to 
make its findings known to the United States. Because Great 
Britain supported Huerta, and Carranza refused to allow the 
United States to intervene in the matter, technically no one 
could make a claim for Benton's body. But if the British 
recognized the belligerency of the Constitutionalists and 
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appointed representatives to rebel controlled territory, 
then they could request the body officially. This forced 
32 
the decision on Sir Edward Grey and the British. 
Sir Edward Grey told Parliament that they would have to 
move slowly because premature recognition of the rebels 
would present problems if Huerta quelled the rebellion. He 
added that while the Constitutionalists refused to allow the 
United States to intervene, he felt that Secretary Bryan and 
President Wilson had shown enough interest in the case to 
continue backing the President's policies. Wilson informed 
the press that he would continue his policy of "Watchful 
Waiting." The occurrence of the incident so soon after the 
repeal of the arms embargo (February 3, 1914) was 
unfortunate but the President would not allow it to change 
his course. The incident did have a decisive effect on the 
rebellion though, because it forced Carranza to assert his 
authority as diplomatic head of the Constitutionalists. Yet 
it did not turn Wilson away from his unofficial backing of 
33 
the Constitutionalists. 
Yielding to pressure from the United States and his own 
advisors, Carranza made it known on March 11, 1914 that 
future cases of claims by other countries on behalf of their 
citizens could be handled by the United States. If another 
country wanted the United States to intervene on the behalf 
of one of its citizens then written notice through the 
proper channels must precede any action by the United 
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States. Villa added that any matter Carranza refused to act 
upon in Chihuahua could be brought to him and he would see 
if he could clear it up. Thus almost immediately after 
Carranza had saved Villa's hide by settling the Benton 
Affair, Villa had again taken the lead in relations with 
foreign governments within territory he controlled. 
Carranza decided the time had come to move his government to 
Chihuahua and attempt to control his most successful 
general. The fact that the revolution had achieved such 
rapid advances also threatened to strand the First Chief in 
the north. His refusal to leave Mexico to make the quick 
trip through the United States from Nogales, Arizona to El 
Paso, Texas stemmed from his fear that if he left Mexico 
someone would usurp his position. Two other men also moved 
to become closer to Villa, Special Agent George Carothers 
34 
and General Felipe Angeles. 
George Carothers was born in 1875 and at the age of 14 
immigrated to Saltillo, Coahuila, with his family. He 
became Consular agent to Torreon in 1902, but was a heavy 
gambler, which kept him constantly in debt and in trouble 
with the State Department. Only his performence during the 
Orozco rebellion, protecting United States citizens and 
property, saved him from being dismissed. On December 9, 
1913 he received orders to go to Chihuahua and establish 
good relations with Villa. His first act as the President's 
Special agent was to temper Villa's attitude towards the 
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Spanish. He succeeded only in convincing Villa that any 
Spaniard who could prove he did not support Huerta could 
35 
return to Mexico and retake possession of their property. 
On the twenty-fifth of February 1914, Carothers 
received orders to remain with Villa. He informed the State 
Department that he thought it better to get permission from 
Carranza before taking up the position. Carranza agreed to 
Carothers' request and gave the new agent a 
Constitutionalist code book. Yet Carothers' presence 
displeased the established Consul in Chihuahua, Marion 
Letcher. Letcher's attitude became so antagonistic that 
Carothers convinced Bryan to order Letcher to cooperate with 
the Executive Agent in any way possible. Carothers gave 
Washington direct access to Mexico's most successful general 
and the two men established a good rapport. Carothers' main 
duty was to inform the State Department of any important 
36 
differences that occurred between Villa and Carranza. 
Yet as the revolution progressed, Carothers began to 
receive substantial amounts of criticism for his handling of 
Villa. His closeness to Villa brought charges of being a 
villista partisan from House and Senate Republicans. 
Carranza also became dissatisfied with the Carothers-Villa 
friendship. He viewed it as near recognition of Villa's 
position as the leader of the Constitutionalist forces. 
Carranza charged that Villa's insubordination over the 
Zacatecas campaign in June of 1914, was caused by Carothers' 
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promises of support from Washington. Whatever Carothers' 
actual role in promoting Villa to Washington, in the long 
run his presence added to the friction between the First 
37 
Chief and Villa. 
General Felipe Angeles also joined Villa in February of 
1914. A Federal artillery officer prior to the Madero 
revolution, Angeles was the sub-secretary of War in 
Carranza's cabinet. He was one of the few generals to 
support Madero actively during the Tragic Ten days and was 
arrested with Madero on February 19, 1913. Angeles was under 
the command of Victoriano Huerta during the fighting in 
Mexico City but did not support the new president and 
accepted a military study mission to Europe. While in Paris 
he wrote Carranza and offered his services to the 
Constitutionalist cause. When Villa requested that the 
sub-Secretary join his army as commander of artillery, 
Carranza consented and Angeles joined Villa prior to the 
•P ' • 38 Torreon campaign. 
Angeles, like Carothers, became an avid Villa partisan 
and the General of the Division del Norte and the former 
Artillery officer formed a good team. Angeles, too, would 
add to the friction developing between Villa and Carranza. 
Again the problem resulted over Villa's conduct in the 
Zacatecas campaign. Carranza charged that Villa's 
insubordination was the result of Angeles' prodding. 
Carranza then branded Angeles a member of the reaction, 
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implying that Villa was also a part of the reaction. 
Angeles sent Carranza an explanation in August of 1914, 
explaining why Villa had disobeyed Carranza's order during 
the Zacatecas campaign. It read like a school master 
explaining a simple concept to an unruly child. Yet 
Zacatecas was still yet to come, first Villa and Carranza 
had to meet in Chihuahua for the first time since the Madero 
39 
rebellion. 
International relations concerning the 
Constitutionalist forces became the first in a series of 
instances that lead to the split between Venustiano Carranza 
and Francisco Villa. In Villa's dealings with both the 
Spanish and Benton, Carranza was forced to backup Villa. 
While he was willing to do it because of Villa's military 
successes, he also realized that he needed to try to control 
Villa's outrages. This forced him to move his headquarters 
from Hermosillo to Chihuahua. This attempt by Carranza 
ultimately failed to bring Villa under control or to 
establish an understanding between the two men. Villa's 
dealings with the Spanish and Benton also brought George 
Carothers into Villa's camp and added friction between the 
latter and Carranza. General Felipe Angeles also joined 
Villa following the Benton affair, and he too added friction 
between Villa and Carranza. First, however, the two 
revolutionaries would meet in Chihuahua and further drive a 
wedge between them. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
"Chocolateros Perfumados" 
"This violation of the national sovereignty . . ." 
wrote Venustiano Carranza to President Woodrow Wilson in 
April 1914, in response to the United States occupation of 
the Mexican port of Veracruz was ". . .highly offensive to 
the dignity and independence of Mexico . . ." and should be 
1 
terminated at once. He added that acts committed by General 
Victoriano Huerta, usurper of the Mexican executive office, 
did not represent Mexico. He warned Wilson that the invasion 
of Veracruz could lead to an unequal war between the United 
States and Mexico. The best possible result was the 
immediate withdrawal of the United States forces. Wilson's 
first and only divergence from his enunciated policy of 
"watchful waiting" had taken an unexpected turn. The leader 
of the Constitutionalist revolt reproached an action that 
began in order to assist the rebels. Yet Wilson did have 
one Mexican supporter, Pancho Villa. Villa said of the 
affair at Veracruz: "Honest, I hope the Americans bottle up 
2 
Veracruz so tight they can't (sic) even get water into it." 
Another event in the Mexican Revolution intensified the 
3 
friction between Villa and Carranza. 
A few weeks before the United States moved into 
Veracruz, Villa and Carranza met in Chihuahua for the first 
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time since the Madero revolt. This meeting did more to 
drive a wedge between the two men then it did to create a 
unified front. Personality differences now came sharply to 
the fore at this meeting. Then came the occupation of 
Veracruz. The different attitude each man took toward the 
invasion heightened the festering discontent that their 
positions vis-a-vis foreign governments had generated. As 
with the former cases, Villa's attitude prevailed and forced 
Carranza to take a secondary position. Yet not only 
international events contributed to the discontent between 
the two men at this juncture of the revolution. A 
disagreement regarding Villa's role in Chihuahua occurred 
during Carranza's stay in Ciudad Chihuahua. The resolution 
of the issue again involved Carranza backing down to Villa 
but brought about a new policy by the First Chief toward his 
very successful general. After May 1914, Carranza would do 
all that he could to contain Villa in the north and let his 
other generals lead the Constitutionalist armies to the City 
of Mexico and a successful conclusion of the revolution. 
Carranza*s decision to move the Constitutionalist 
government from Hermosillo, Sonora, to the state of 
Chihuahua had a variety of sources. The Benton Affair in 
February 1914, showed Carranza the necessity of moving to 
Chihuahua to attempt to control Villa's excesses. Villa 
also invited Carranza to move the government there because 
of a disagreement Villa had with Manuel Chao, the civilian 
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4 
governor appointed by Carranza. 
But the most important reason for Carranza1s move to 
Chihuahua had to do with logistics. The rapid advance of 
the Constitutionalist armies threatened to strand Carranza 
in the north. The main transportation artery, the Mexican 
Central Railroad, built during the porfiriato, ran from 
Ciudad Juarez, through Chihuahua City, Torreon, Zacatecas, 
and on to Mexico City. Huerta realized the importance of 
this iron highway and garrisoned the major cities with the 
bulk of his forces. Villa's victories along the route of 
the Mexican Central in early 1914, showed Carranza that 
unless he moved, Villa could arrive at the capital before 
him. Carranza first moved north to avoid traveling through 
the worst of the mountains. On March 12, 1914, he left Agua 
Prieta, Sonora, for the two-week horseback ride to Ciudad 
, 5 
Juarez, Chihuahua. 
Carranza arrived in Ciudad Juarez while Villa and his 
forces battled at San Pedro. A big reception greeted 
Carranza in Juarez to which Villa replied when hearing of 
it: "Let him stay up there with his feasts, this is the key 
6 
to the situation down here." Special agent George Carothers 
foresaw many complications in the relationship between Villa 
and Carranza. Up to this point, wrote Carothers to Secretary 
of State Bryan, Carranza had failed to assume control of 
anything. Villa continued to manage events in Chihuahua. He 
had a separate organization in Juirez, accountable only to 
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him. This organization purchased all of Villa's munitions 
and sold all confiscated goods without rendering any 
accounts to Carranza. Carothers believed that Carranza 
feared Villa and was prepared to leave him alone. If 
Carranza took control of the situation Villa would let him, 
but Villa hated cowards and could, like the feral creature 
he was, sniff Carranza's discomfiture. All this convinced 
Carothers that their meeting in Ciudad Chihuahua would lead 
7 
to nothing positive. 
The meeting in Chihuahua between Villa and Carranza 
began badly. Villa had just returned from the successful 
campaign against San Pedro and still wore his dusty, dirty 
clothes. He embraced Carranza in the traditional abrazo, to 
which Carranza responded rather coldly and stiffly. Villa 
said after that Carranza never looked him in the eyes during 
their conversation and that the two men had nothing in 
common. Carranza treated Villa in a condescending manner 
making the mistake that Madero and Gonzalez had avoided. 
Villa said later: "I thought then that this man will not 
bring us to a good end: he had already given every thing 
8 
good in his life that he could give." Yet Villa did not 
immediately disavow the First Chief. He acknowledged his 
allegiance to the Plan de Guadalupe, but called the 
civilians around Carranza and the First Chief chocolateros 
perfumados, (perfumed chocolate drinkers), underscoring his 
9 
attitude towards the urban politicians. An episode 
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occurring at the port of Tampico, Mexico, exacerbated this 
10 
growing discontent between Villa and Carranza. 
On the morning of April 9, 1914, the paymaster of the 
U.S.S. Dolphin and his seven-man crew landed in a restricted 
area of Tampico harbor to pick up some gas for the boats 
ferrying supplies to the United States warships in the 
harbor. The federales restricted the area because of rebel 
attacks in the area. Unfortunately the paymaster of the 
Dolphin knew nothing of this. While loading their cargo a 
squad of Mexican Federal soldiers, following orders, 
arrested the United States crew. When arrested, two of the 
Americans were still in the boat. The two in the boat at 
first refused to leave, but the federales' guns proved 
persuasive. Unknown to the Mexican Federal officer this 
action constituted an act of war. This minor incident soon 
11 
began to escalate. 
The Mexicans marched the United States soldiers through 
the streets for about five minutes until they reached a 
superior officer. This officer immediately became enraged 
with his subordinate and apologized to the paymaster for the 
mistaken arrest. This officer then allowed the paymaster to 
return to the whaleboat and continue loading the gas. 
Before they finished their task, General Ignacio Morelos 
Zaragoza, commander of the Federal forces in Tampico, came 
to the wharf and again apologized. He told the paymaster 
that an ignorant junior officer committed the error. He 
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apologized again, and the United States crew returned to the 
12 
Dolphin. 
When Admiral Henry Mayo, United States Commander of the 
Fifth Naval Division stationed at Tampico, heard of the 
incident, he sent a note to General Zaragoza demanding that 
the junior officer be severly punished and that the Mexicans 
render a twenty-one gun salute to the United States flag. 
Admiral Frank Fletcher, Mayo's counterpart and United States 
Commander of the Forth Naval Division stationed at Veracruz, 
agreed that some type of reprisal was necessary for the 
insult to the flag. President Wilson agreed. Mayo's demand 
for the salute was for the next day, but Zaragoza told him 
that he could not make that kind of decision, only the 
president, Victoriano Huerta, could. On April 13, Huerta 
told the press that he would not salute the United States 
flag because "... such a step would be highly derogatory 
13 
to national dignity." The minor incident at Tampico Harbor 
had escalated from junior officers to commanding officers to 
14 
presidents, but it had not ended. 
On April 15, Huerta proposed that both sides fire a 
salute to show good faith. Huerta wanted the United States 
to fire first because he feared that they would not respond 
to the salute in an attempt to humiliate him. He had reason 
for his fear. When a Mexican ship passed through the newly 
completed Panama Canal, a Mexican salute to the United 
States flag went unanswered. The whole matter of salutes 
- 89 -
was wrapped up in international law. President Wilson 
wanted to avoid saluting the Mexican flag because that would 
imply recognition of Huerta's government. Yet just the fact 
that the United States demanded a salute from a government 
it did not recognize meant a type of recognition. Wilson 
avoided this maze by stating that he wanted the salute from 
Huerta personally, not as the representative of Mexico. For 
the next six days, the diplomats tried to solve the 
15 
impasse. 
United States Charge d'Affairs to Mexico, Nelson 
0'Shaughnessy, worked diligently to solve the dispute. He 
had established a good working relationship with Huerta and 
V 
on the sixteenth convinced Huerta that a simultaneous salute 
was the best the Mexican President could expect from the 
United States government. 0'Shaughnessy informed Secretary 
Bryan of this new development, but the secretary rejected 
* 
the idea of a simultaneous salute. Bryan wrote: 
"International practice demands that Huerta fulfill the 
16 
demands of the United States ..." He also dispatched a 
flotilla of ships to Tampico Harbor in order to force Huerta 
to fire the salute. Bryan wrote 0'Shaughnessy that " . . . 
there would be no further discussion as to the exact method 
17 
of an exchange of salutes." 
0'Shaughnessy tried one last approach to achieve a 
peaceful settlement of the dispute. Huerta agreed to salute 
the United States flag first if the United States promised 
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to respond, and he wanted a protocol to insure the 
response. 0'Shaughnessy prepared the protocol and sent it 
to the State Department. Bryan replied that no concessions 
could be made. Huerta must fire a salute as an apology for 
the arrest of the sailors. When completed, international 
law required that the United States respond. A signed 
protocol would imply recognition but, Bryan told 
01Shaughnessy, Huerta could rest assured that the United 
States would live up to its international requirements. 
Bryan also instructed 0'Shaughnessy to inform Huerta that he 
had until 6:00 p.m. April 19, to agree to the United 
States' demands. If Huerta refused, President Wilson would 
put the matter before Congress. On April 19, at 5:00 p.m., 
O1Shaughnessy called at the Mexican Foreign Office and was 
handed a note saying that Mexico could not accept the 
uncompromising attitude of the United States. The Mexican 
Foreign Minister considered the matter closed. Diplomacy 
had failed to settle the matter and the final escalation 
18 
followed. 
On the afternoon of April 20, 1914, President Woodrow 
Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress. Without asking 
for a formal declaration, he requested war powers in order 
to do whatever was necessary to punish Huerta. He advised 
Congress of the Tampico incident, saying that Huerta's 
apology was not sufficient and a salute was mandatory. He 
also cited the arrest of a mail orderly from the U.S.S. 
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19 
Minnesota as evidence of Huerta's bad faith. The House 
passed the President's resolution by a vote of 323 to 9, but 
the Senate postponed the matter until the next day. Before 
the Senate could decide on the resolution, further 
20 
developments made the vote moot. 
That evening the United States Consul to Veracruz, 
William Canada, reported that the Hamburg-American steamer 
Ypiranga was scheduled to arrive the next morning at the 
Mexican port of Veracruz with a vast amount of munitions for 
21 
Huerta. Three trains of ten cars each were waiting to take 
the arms to the front. In the early morning hours of April 
21, Secretary Bryan telephoned President Wilson and received 
instructions to prevent the landing of the arms. At 4:00 
a.m., Admiral Fletcher received orders to take the customs 
house at Veracruz and prevent the delivery of the arms. 
Wilson believed that the landing would be unopposed because 
one of his special agents, John Lind, informed him that the 
Mexican people would rejoice at the arrival of the United 
2 2  
States forces. Lind was wrong. 
Marines and Bluejackets landed at Veracruz on April 21, 
1914, and quickly took control of the custom house. The 
bulk of the Mexican Federal Army reacted by retreating to 
Tijeria, five miles west of Veracruz. On the twenty-second 
general fighting broke out as the United States forces 
expanded their control from the harbor area. Most of the 
fighting was confined to rooftop sniping from small groups 
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of soldiers and civilians, but blood flowed on both sides. 
The center of resistance was the Mexican Naval Academy, 
which the big guns of the navy soon quieted. The forces of 
the United States achieved their control of the city that 
afternoon, and Admiral Fletcher, in a proclamation, informed 
the people of Veracruz that the United States intended to 
23 
remain in control for some time. 
Ironically, the Ypiranga was not detained in the 
harbor. It arrived at about noon of the twenty-first, and 
its captain was told that he was not permitted to leave the 
harbor. Two days later the captain received orders from the 
Americans to unload his cargo. The captain refused, and 
indicated that he would return to Germany. When the Ypiranga 
left Veracruz it headed for Puerto Mexico, 200 miles south 
and with Huerta's permission, unloaded its arms. The arms 
reached Mexico City by the end of May, but too late to be of 
any use in the north. The pretext for the landing had 
24 
slipped away. 
Wilson also found another unexpected result. Reports 
of casualties put 12 Americans dead and 50-60 wounded. 
While over 150 Mexicans were estimated killed or wounded. 
Wilson's first words when hearing of the casualties were: 
25 
"I'm sorry, terribly sorry." He appeared to be visibly 
shaken, sad, and disheartened. On the twenty-first a joint 
session of Congress resolved that the President was 
justified in employing the armed forces in his dispute with 
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Huerta. Yet, the occupation of Veracruz resulted in an 
unexpected foe and caused problems in the Constitutionalist 
26 
ranks. 
The occupation of Veracruz by United States forces 
brought a strong note of protest from Venustiano Carranza, 
the man the invasion was intended to help. Carranza 
steadfastly believed that the Constitutionalist government 
under his command was the only legal government in Mexico 
and, as a result, the United States had no right to 
intervene in a dispute with Huerta. In his note to Secretary 
Bryan, Carranza informed the United States that the 
Constitutionalists would deal with Huerta when the time came 
and to evacuate their forces immediately. Carranza warned 
that the Huerta*s acts were not sufficient to involve the 
two countries in a war, but if the United States did not 
evacuate, then war was inevitable. Carranza added that if 
complaints were brought to him, then as the true leader of 
Mexico, he would settle them. Carranza1s note was deadly 
serious, and the El Paso Herald reported on April 23, that 
Villa had 15,000 men ready in Juarez to invade El Paso. The 
27 
situation between the two countries was tense. 
Villa's position in the matter until April 23, seemed 
to correspond to Carranza's. Yet this reflected the fact 
that carrancista supporters censored all of Villa's 
telegrams from Chihuahua. Villa decided that it was 
necessary for him to go to the border, Ciudad Juarez, and 
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let the American people know his true feelings about the 
occupation. Villa informed George Carothers that he had no 
problem with the United States occupation of Veracruz as 
long as they did not expand their control. He said the 
United States had done what the rebels could not do. His 
repudiation of Carranza's demand for evacuation of Veracruz 
eased much of the tension between the two countries. As one 
journalist in the United States put it: "Nothing Villa has 
ever done has been so much to his credit as his recent trip 
to the border to loosen the tension between his people and 
28 
the Americans, which was reaching the breaking point." 
Villa, in a letter to the Secretary of State, said that 
Carranza's pride was excusable because it was in the defense 
of the dignity of Mexico. Carothers told Bryan that 
Constitutionalist neutrality could be established through 
Villa. Yet many reports also told of tensions developing 
29 
between Villa and Carranza over their opposite views. 
On April 25, 1914, the El Paso Herald reported that 
Carranza had not backed down from his previous position. In 
a cablegram to Madrid, Spain, dated from Chihuahua, Carranza 
reiterated his readiness to go to war with the United 
States. Villa's direct contradiction of Carranza led the 
same newspaper to believe that the split between Villa and 
Carranza was already fact. It added that Villa still 
claimed to be Carranza's subordinate but discounted the 
claim. Yet both men already began to move to a compromise 
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position on the occupation. In response to Wilson's letter 
to Carranza stating that the United States did not have a 
quarrel with the Constitutionalists, Villa said: "I am a 
soldier and not a diplomat and in that capacity it would be 
30 
improper for me to comment on the matter." Villa was 
backing away from his opposition to Carranza. Roberto 
Pesqueira, Carranza's confidential agent in Juarez, reported 
that Carranza's original message to Secretary Bryan did not 
mean war, but was a friendly note. Carranza too, began to 
retreat from his uncompromising attitude. On April 27, 
i 
Villa left Juarez for Chihuahua in order to confer with 
31 
Carranza. 
On April 29, Villa and Carranza met in the Chihuahuan 
Governor's palace for almost three hours discussing the 
Veracruz incident and its aftermath. The results of the 
conference, stated in a telegram to the El Paso Herald, 
reported that Carranza had changed his mind and was now in 
complete agreement with Villa. Villa's attitude was seconded 
by Carranza's advisors, and together they convinced the 
First Chief to soften his attitude. Villa and Carranza also 
discounted reports of a split between them, adding that 
rumors of friction came from their enemies in an attempt to 
bring discord between the two. Villa also publically 
reaffirmed his unquestionable loyalty to Carranza. Villa and 
Carranza had solved their difficulties over their reaction 
to the occupation, but President Wilson found himself in a 
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difficult position. 
The occupation of Veracruz by the United States caused 
a very strong undercurrent of resentment towards the United 
States in Mexico and Latin America. Anti-American 
demonstrations broke out in Mexico City on the twenty-third 
with the American flag being thrown to the ground and 
33 
trampled to chants of "Death to the Yankees." 
Demonstrations against the United States were also reported 
in Argentina and Brazil. In Mexico City the demonstrators 
continued to rally night and day through the twenty-fifth. 
The Federals successfully recruited all over Mexico under 
the pretext of war with the United States. That these new 
troops would fight the Constitutionalists in the longrun 
seemed too obvious for many. The extreme outrage in Mexico 
and throughout Latin America caught Wilson off-guard. He 
expected the troops to be greeted with open arms. He needed 
34 
a face saving way out of the whole sorry business. 
On April 26, 1914, Venustiano Carranza received word 
from the ABC countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), of 
mediation to take place between Huerta and the United 
States. The conference originally met to avert war between 
the United States and Mexico and gave Wilson a way out of 
the situation. Both Huerta and Wilson agreed to an 
armistice while the mediators endeavored to settle the two 
countries' differences. Yet the aims of the conference 
quickly changed. Instead of working only to avert war 
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between the United States and Mexico, the mediators wanted 
to reconstruct Mexico through a temporary government. The 
Tampico incident ultimately became lost in the shuffle. As 
the agenda of the conference changed, so, too, did Wilson's 
aims. Wilson decided that the mediators would meet until 
they reached a successful settlement provided it was a 
settlement on his terms. Attempts to bring the 
Constitutionalists into the conference failed because 
Carranza refused to allow internal matters into the 
discussion. Wilson and the mediators demanded that a 
settlement to the revolution be included in any outcome to 
the conference. Ultimately the conference failed because of 
its agenda and the success of the Constitutionalists. Yet 
the rebels did not remain a united group, and friction 
between Villa and Carranza continued to mount following the 
35 
Tampico incident and invasion of Veracruz. 
The political situation in Chihuahua caused added 
problems between Villa and Carranza. Before the capture of 
Ciudad Chihuahua in December 1913, Villa intended to appoint 
Juan Medina as civilian governor. But Carranza sent Jesifs 
Acuna to tell Villa to place Manuel Chao in the top civilian 
position in Chihuahua. Acuna told Villa that Medina would 
conspire against him and when Medina did not consult Villa 
on civil appointments, Villa removed him. Medina responded 
by fleeing north. After the taking of Chihuahua, Chao, 
Villa, Maclovio Herrera, and Jose Rodriguez decided to place 
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Villa in the governor's chair. He held the position for a 
few weeks and then transfered the position to Chao in 
compliance with Carranza's orders. Yet all this maneuvering 
led to a contradictory situation. Villa as military head of 
Chihuahua was superior to Chao. But in civilian affairs 
Villa was Chao's subordinate. This led to a problem between 
36 
Villa and Chao which ultimately involved Carranza. 
In late April and early May, an internal disruption in 
the Constitutionalist ranks began to manifest itself in 
Chihuahua. Villa began to believe that Manuel Chao was 
running Chihuahua without due respect for his authority. 
Since Carranza's arrival in Chihuahua, Chao followed 
Carranza's orders more and more. But when Villa returned 
from Juarez, he told Chao that the latter governed because 
he allowed it and not because Carranza ordered it. Carranza 
also had filled all government offices in Chihuahua with his 
followers, creating a dual government in that state, one 
loyal to Carranza, the other to Villa. Villa as Chao's 
superior officer ordered him to go to Torreon and assume 
command of one of the Division del Norte's brigades. Chao 
responded that as governor he did not have to take orders 
from Villa. Villa replied by ordering Chao shot for 
insubordination. Chao got himself out of the difficulty by 
reassuring Villa of his loyalty and accepting the 
appointment at Torreon. They settled the matter between 
themselves but Carranza decided to intrude into the 
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matter. 
The whole problem resulted from Carranza's attempt to 
belittle Villa's accomplishments and replace him as military 
leader of Chihuahua. When Carranza heard of Villa's order to 
shoot Chao he demanded an explanation. Villa told Carranza 
that Chao was governing badly and he had taken care of it by 
appointing General Fidel Avila as military governor of 
Chihuahua. Carranza's men in Chihuahua were removed from 
their civilian governmental positions and Villa retained 
control of Chihuahua. A split had been avoided but, Carranza 
came to the realization that Villa could no longer be 
trusted to move south. Carranza feared that Villa would 
reach Mexico City ahead of more loyal carrancista troops. 
This desire by Carranza to contain Villa in the north led to 
38 
the definitive split between him and Villa. 
The timing of Carranza's arrival in Chihuahua just 
before the United States occupation of Veracruz was decisive 
for the unity of the Constitutionalist cause. Villa's 
courtship of the United States and Carranza's extreme and 
opportunistic nationalism were given an outlet that 
contradicted each other. Yet as in the Benton case and 
Villa's dealings with the Spanish, Carranza took a 
subordinate position to Villa. This repeated flaunting of 
Carranza's position as First Chief contributed to the 
decision to contain Villa to northern Mexico. The same can 
be said for Villa's attitude towards the governing of 
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Chihuahua. Villa yielded to Carranza in cases that did not 
dispute his control. But as in the case of Chao, when Villa 
felt his position threatened, he protected himself, even at 
the risk of disobeying Carranza. Again events of the 
revolution had exacerbated personality differences between 
Villa and Carranza. A conflict in strategy in the campaign 
south towards Mexico City manifested itself in June and 
brought about the split that had been developing since the 
beginning of the year. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
"Senor . . . You are a Son of a Bitch" 
For over five hours the generals of the Division del 
Norte had considered, coded, and decoded the telegraphs from 
and to Venustaino Carranza. The man refused to listen to 
their explanations. Finally their leader, Pancho Villa had 
had enough and instructed the telegraph operator to send the 
message. "Senor I resign the command of this Division. Tell 
me whom to deliver it," wired Villa to Carranza during the 
1 
six hour telegraphic conference on June 13, 1914. Carranza 
replied: "Although with true pain, I am obliged to accept 
your retirement from the command as Chief of the Division of 
the North, I give to you the thanks in the name of the 
Nation, for the important services that you have presented 
2 
to our cause ..." Carranza's attitude outraged Villa's 
generals. They believed that Villa's threatened resignation 
would force Carranza to concede to their demands. But they 
should have anticipated Carranza's response. Maclovio 
Herrera told the telegrapher to send the following; "Senor 
Carranza I am informed of your treatment of my General 
Francisco Villa. You are a son of a bitch. Maclovio 
3 
Herrera!" Herrera's determination to send the telegram was 
backed up by his gun, but General Felipe Angeles was able to 
calm the situation and the telegram was not sent. 
- 107 -
Nevertheless the definitive split between Pancho Villa and 
4 
Venustiano Carranza had arrived. 
The split between Carranza and Villa that had been 
developing since February 1914 found its outlet in June 1914 
over the conduct of the military campaign south against 
Huerta. Carranza decided that the time had come to limit 
Villa's role to the area he controlled in the north. His 
first strategy in that direction involved a two pronged 
movement. First, he diverted Villa from moving south out of 
Torreon and sent him east to attack Saltillo. Next the First 
Chief promoted Panfilo Natera to command the newly formed 
Central Division and assigned him the task of the attack on 
Zacatecas, the last huertista stronghold before Mexico City. 
Villa for his part accepted the Saltillo assignment but when 
he easily chased the Federal Army from there, he again began 
to prepare to move south. At this point the goals of Villa 
and Carranza began to conflict. Only their desire to defeat 
Huerta, their common enemy, averted actual military 
conflict. Efforts by those surrounding both men then 
extended the period before an outright split, but the die 
was cast and the two primary leaders of the 
Constitutionalist Revolution inched toward open warfare. 
Villa's military success against the Federals from 
Juarez to Torreon proved that Huerta's control of Mexico was 
fast crumbling. Huerta had held out longer then most people 
believed possible and against tremendous odds. He displayed 
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good qualities, being tenacious and calm in the face of 
constant difficulty. In early May he still held sway over a 
vast portion of Mexico. Villa's recapture of Torreon in late 
March and early April gave the rebels a strategic position 
on the Mexican Central Railroad, but that was barely outside 
the state of Chihuahua. Huerta still held the capital of 
Coahuila, Saltillo - Carranza's home state - and the 
concentration of troops at Zacatecas blocked Villa's path 
south. The situation had deteriorated but not yet to a 
critical level. The Constitutionalists needed to drive the 
federales from these two cities in order to make the 
5 
Revolution militarily dominant. 
Carranza moved his headquarters from Ciudad Chihuahua 
to Torreon in May. When he arrived Villa proudly showed the 
First Chief his preparations for the advance south on 
Zacatecas. Carranza disapproved and informed Villa that all 
future military plans needed to be submitted for approval to 
a commission recently formed by the First Chief. The motives 
behind Carranza's position stemmed from Villa's military 
successes. Carranza believed that the revolution would 
better profit from one of the other generals investing 
Mexico City. Carranza wanted the honor to go to Alvaro 
Obregon and the division of the Northwest, but the former 
needed time to make the overland journey from Tepic to 
Guadalajara. Villa's ability to use the Mexican Central to 
move on the Capital worried Carranza, and, for this reason, 
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he ordered Villa to advance on Saltillo. Villa argued that 
Saltillo fell into the jurisdiction of Pablo Gonzalez' 
Division of the Northeast and that he should continue his 
preparations for the Zacatecas campaign. Carranza remained 
6 
adamant on Saltillo and Villa reluctantly agreed. 
Carranza's political maneuvering disgusted Villa. 
Formerly Villa had left the political arena to men such as 
Silvestre Terrazas, Felipe Angeles, and Roque Gonzalez Garza 
but, out of necessity, began to take a greater interest in 
the Byzantine procedures. Villa believed that the 
politicians around Carranza caused this problem and accepted 
the responsibility of attacking Saltillo in order not to 
precipitate tension between himself and the First Chief. 
Villa directed his forces in the attack on Saltillo on the 
19th-21st of May. A massed cavalry attack on the city of 
Paredon, between Torreon and Saltillo, sent the Federales 
fleeing. The defenders quickly evacuated Saltillo when 
Villa's forces continued to advance. Villa entered Saltillo 
on the twenty-first. He then delivered to Carranza the 
capital of the State of which the the First Chief was 
constitutional governor. Carranza again transferred his 
government, this time to the place he had evacuated more 
7 
then a year before. 
Villa returned to Torreon on the twenty-ninth of May, 
leaving only a 5000 man garrison in Saltillo, again to 
prepare for his advance on Zacatecas. When he arrived in 
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Torreon his advisors told him that Panfilo Natera and the 
Arrieta brothers, Domingo and Mariano, had already begun to 
move on Zacatecas. They informed him that Carranza had 
created a new division, the Central, outside of Villa's 
military provenance. Villa's advisors also told him about 
Carranza's appointment of Natera as commander of the Central 
Division in an attempt to woo Natera away from Villa's 
influence. Villa could not understand how Carranza thought 
that Natera with 6,000 men could take Zacatecas when the 
whole Division del Norte, 15,000 men strong, had trouble 
taking Torreon. Villa decided to continue preparations for 
his own advance. At this point friction between Villa and 
Carranza was minimal. Villa reported on June 5 that 
Natera's commission did not threaten him because he never 
claimed to be commander-in-chief of the revolutionary 
, 8 
forces, just of the Division del Norte. 
Relations between Villa and Carranza were strained 
though. Carranza still wanted to curtail Villa's activities 
south of Torreon and did this by withholding ammunition and 
supplies. United States Consul to Chihuahua, Marion 
Letcher, reported that Carranza's aim was to limit Villa's 
power to the State of Chihuahua where the "Centaur of the 
North" had total control anyway. Letcher further claimed 
that the other generals agreed with Carranza and viewed 
Villa as a menace to Mexico. Villa, thought Special Agent 
George Carothers, would continue to be patient with Carranza 
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9 
but if trouble was forced on him, he would act decisively. 
On June 10 Carranza wired Villa ordering the latter to 
be ready to aid Natera if it became necessary. The next day 
Natera began the assault on Zacatecas but quickly realized 
that he needed more men. Ten to twelve thousand federales 
defended the city. On June 11 another cable arrived telling 
Villa to send 3000 men to reinforce Natera. Villa replied 
that he believed that his whole division should move. On 
June 12 Carranza cabled back that instead of 3000 men, Villa 
should send 5000 men under the command of Jose Isabel 
Robles. He should also send any ammunition that he could 
spare. Villa sent back word that Robles was sick and that 
he had already given the order to prepare for the move on 
Zacatecas. Villa realized that Carranza was intriguing 
against him and arranged a telegraphic conference for June 
10 
13, 1914. 
On the 13th Villa opened the conference by asking 
Carranza who ordered Natera to begin the attack on Zacatecas 
with insufficient forces. He continued by informing the 
First Chief that he needed at least five days before he 
could send reinforcements to Natera because his troops 
needed time to rest after the Saltillo campaign. 
Furthermore, he needed time to resupply his forces. He told 
Carranza that Robles could not lead the troops because he 
was sick and that Tomas Urbina was not a good choice because 
of animosity between himself and the Arrieta brothers-. If 
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Carranza wished someone else to lead the division, Villa 
would permit it, if he felt the replacement could do the 
job. He also questioned Carranza as to who would be overall 
11 
leader when he reached Zacatecas, him or Natera. 
Carranza responded that he ordered the attack on 
Zacatecas. He told Villa that according to General Arrieta 
the rebels had taken good positions outside the city. The 
First Chief then began to instruct Villa on the art of war. 
He told Villa that he had made a mistake in the battle for 
Ciudad Chihuahua and after a few days of fighting had to 
retreat. Then before the second battle of Torreon, Carranza 
ordered the troops of Robles, Contreras, Urbina and other 
forces under officers of lesser grade to assist Villa and 
only by those orders was Villa able to take that city. 
Carranza now found it necessary to order Villa to send 
troops to reinforce Natera. He did not order Villa himself 
to go, and thus the question of whether Villa would be 
subordinate to Natera was moot. In reply to Villa's veiled 
threat to resign, Carranza hoped that the general would 
not. But as First Chief he felt honor bound to accept it, 
if it were tendered. Carranza also told Villa that if 
Robles was sick, one of his other generals could lead the 
12 
reinforcements. 
At this point Villa resigned his position as General in 
Chief of the Division del Norte. Carothers reported that 
Carranza was overjoyed that the breach had come. He refused 
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to listen to any of the Special Agent's reasoning to rescind 
the acceptance of the resignation. He requested that Villa 
suggest who should take command of the forces, and that 
Generals Felipe Angeles, Jose Robles, Tom^s Urbina, Calixto 
Contreras, Eugenio Aguirre Benavides, Severiano Ceniceros, 
Jose Rodriguez, Maclovio Herrera, Toribio Ortega, Martiniano 
Servin, and Maximo Garcia remain at the telegraph office to 
confer with him. Villa left the station. Carranza 
telegraphed the above mentioned generals that they should 
chose an interim replacement for Villa from among 
themselves. If there was someone else who could do the job 
about whom he was uninformed, they should tell him. The 
generals requested the First Chief to reconsider his 
decision to accept Villa's resignation. They believed that 
a split at this time would have serious consequences both 
inside the country and out. Carranza remained adament. He 
told the generals that before accepting their leaders' 
resignation he did consider the consequences and decided to 
accept the resignation. They now should choose a successor 
13 
and carry out his order to move on Zacatecas. 
Carranza's acceptance of Villa's resignation put 
Villa's generals in a difficult position. They all 
considered resigning but decided that it was Villa's duty to 
reassume command of the division. They conveyed all this to 
Carranza and advised him to accept their decision in order 
to destroy their common enemy. Carranza replied that he 
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could not change his decision because of the effect it could 
have on discipline within the ranks. Three days earlier he 
ordered Villa to send reinforcements to Natera, and it still 
had not been done. He did not command the whole division to 
go just the forces under Generals Contreras, Robles, 
Pereyra, Aguirre Benavides, and Garcia Carrillo, which the 
First Chief did not consider part of the Division of the 
North anyway. Carranza believed that their decision to 
retain Villa came under pressure from the latter and that 
they should order the attack outside of Villa's presence. 
14 
That ended the telegraphic conference. 
The telegraphic conference lasted for six hours because 
of the need to keep the matter private, so all the 
telegraphs were in code. For a short while Carranza 
believed he had finally bottled up Villa in the North. The 
First Chief ordered Villa to assume the Governorship of 
Chihuahua, but this only reflected Villa's true position in 
the state. Yet Carranza did not take into consideration the 
attitude of Villa's subordinates. Carranza's position put 
Villa's lieutenants in a dilemma: disloyalty to Villa or 
revolt against Carranza. They chose the latter. On the 
fourteenth Villa's generals cabled Carranza their decision. 
They told the First Chief that they had considered their 
course of action in Villa's absence and then informed Villa 
of their decision that he remain as their leader. Villa 
accepted. Moreover, they told Carranza, all the generals 
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signing were members of the Division del Norte, and that 
included Generals Robles, Contreras, and Aguirre 
15 
Benavides. 
Carranza telegraphed in reply that to solve this 
problem Generals Angeles, Herrera, Ortega, Aguirre Benavides 
and Hernandez should come to Saltillo the next day to 
discuss the situation. The generals told Carranza that he 
did not seem to understand their last two messages. They 
had convinced Villa that for the good of the country he must 
remain in command of the division. They knew that Carranza 
wanted to curtail Villa's authority, but they would not 
allow it. The Generals felt that Carranza was questioning 
their conduct as men, but they did not consider their action 
as traitorous. They could not meet with the First Chief the 
16 
next day because the division was moving on Zacatecas. 
That evening Manuel Chao arrived in Torreon with three 
hundred men. When he heard of Carranza's attitude toward 
Villa he sent a telegram of his own to the First Chief. Chao 
informed Carranza that he supported the generals in 
everything they had done. Yet Carranza refused to let the 
matter drop. He withheld coal shipments to Villa from the 
Coahuila mines, and thus Villa had to get his coal from El 
Paso. This became impossible after June 16 because two 
bridges washed out between Torreon and Juarez. Both sides 
discontinued sending rolling stock for fear of not getting 
it back. It seemed as if nothing could get Villa and 
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17 
Carranza moving in the same direction again. 
On the fifteenth villista officials deposed all 
Carranza supporters in Juarez. Villista forces took control 
of the telegraphic and customs offices in Juarez and 
arrested all Carranza supporters. Villa's control now 
extended from Juarez to Torreon. The Constitutionalist 
treasury in Juarez also was confiscated by villista 
officials. But by the 18th Villa and Carranza had come to 
an agreement to postpone their differences until after the 
conclusion of the campaign against Huerta. Villa would have 
absolute control of military affairs, while Carranza 
retained control of civilian matters. All the carrancistas 
arrested by Villa were released and they took up their old 
jobs. Villa also ordered the Constitutionalist treasury 
18 
returned. 
Villa's arrival at Zacatecas on the twentieth of June 
gave the rebels a two to one advantage over the federales. 
Natera's first attack on June 12 was repelled because of 
federale numerical superiority. The federals had 10,000 
well fortified men compared to Natera's 6,000 poorly 
supplied forces. Villa's forces, though, cast the deciding 
role in the battle. Zacatecas fell on the afternoon of the 
twenty-third. Special Agent Leon Canova gave a chilling 
account of the looting and pillaging of Zacatecas. In the 
days that it required to dispose of the rotting corpses, 
dogs and pigs feasted on the human carrion. On the 
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twenty-fifth Villa ordered all priests arrested and placed a 
100,000 peso ransom upon their release. The citizens of 
Zacatecas collected the complete amount by the thirtieth and 
Villa released the clergy. Yet, the time to settle the 
differences created by the events that led to the battle had 
19 
come. 
After capturing Zacatecas Villa had planned on 
continuing his move south. Three reasons, however, 
compelled him to abandon his march on Mexico City. First, 
Pablo Gonzalez failed to attack and capture San Luis Potosi. 
This left his right flank open. Secondly, Carranza refused 
to supply him with the coal he needed to run the trains 
necessary to move his army south. The washout of the 
bridges between Juarez and Chihuahua precluded him from 
obtaining the coal from the United States. Thirdly, Carranza 
refused to send Villa ammunition and his forces had used 
great quantities in capturing Zacatecas. For these reasons 
he decided to consolidate his holdings, and with the consent 
of his generals he moved north and distributed his men 
between Juarez and Torreon. Villa also decided to seize the 
Constitutionalist treasury again and arrest Carranza's 
treasurer-general and other carrancista officials in Ciudad 
Juarez. This put Carranza in a difficult position since 
Juarez was the main distribution point for Constitutionalist 
currency. Thus Carranza was willing to work out an 
20 
arrangement with Villa. 
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The day Villa entered Zacatecas (June 23) two lawyers 
representing General Pablo Gonzalez met with Villa in an 
attempt to heal the breach between the First Chief and the 
"Centaur of the North." Yet Carranza did two things at this 
time that inhibited the reconciliation process. First he 
removed Felipe Angeles from the office of Minister of War. 
Then he promoted Pablo Gonzalez and Alvaro Obregon to 
division generals. He excluded Villa from this honor even 
though Villa had a larger and better equipped army then 
either of the other two. Gonzalez* and Villa's 
representives met and arranged a conference between the 
generals of the North (Villa) and Northeast (Gonzalez) to be 
held in Torreon. Villa and Gonzalez agreed to have 
representatives of their divisions meet on July 4, to settle 
21 
the differences between the First Chief and Villa. 
Before Gonzalez agreed to the meeting he met with 
Carranza. Carranza gave his consent to the conference but 
only if Gonzalez kept secret the consultation with him. 
When asked about the conference, Carranza denied sending the 
commission of generals, but said he would not place 
obstacles in the way of a settlement. He put the blame for 
the bad relations on Villa for not being obedient or 
disciplined. But the First Chief agreed to overlook Villa's 
past transgressions if the latter restrained his passions 
and recognized constituted authority. If Villa refused to 
control his passions, Carranza believed that the former 
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would be a menace to the revolution. Carranza told Special 
Agent Canova: "If his excesses are tolerated and condoned 
22 
today he will be a peril tomorrow." The delegation from 
the division of the Northeast arrived in Torreon on July 4, 
and the conference lasted until the eighth. Villa and 
Gonzalez signed the resulting "Pact of Torreon" the next 
23 
day. 
The "Pact of Torreon" provided a means to bring the 
villista and carrancista factions back together. It 
provided for the release of the forty odd prisoners and 
money taken in Juarez. Carranza retained his position as 
First Chief of the revolution, but his authority would be 
limited to civilian and diplomatic affairs. It also 
proposed the calling of a convention of the military leaders 
following the conclusion of the revolution with 
representation based on one delegate per 1000 troops. It 
also advised that the interim president be a civilian. 
Villa wrote up a list of delegates that he would be willing 
to accept in Carranza*s cabinet. The resulting agreement 
constituted a very mild compromise, with both sides giving 
up very little. Yet the commission did not settle the 
dispute between Villa and Carranza because Carranza refused 
24 
to accept it. 
In August 1914, General Felipe Angeles sent Carranza a 
letter explaining why Villa and his generals did not follow 
orders concerning the Zacatecas campaign. Angeles told 
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Carranza that refusal to obey the order did not withdraw 
recognition of his First Chieftainship; rather, the decision 
was made only to defeat their common enemy. The tone of the 
letter began in respectful terms but quickly degenerated to 
condescension. Villa's decision to keep his forces 
together, wrote Angeles, only followed a classic rule of 
war: use all forces available. At this point Angeles began 
to lecture Carranza on the art of war. Von Molke during the 
Franco-Prussian war, 1870-1871, found out only too late that 
he did not have the forces to defeat the French totally. 
Von Molke concluded that a commander never had enough 
troops. The note at this point read like a course in 
military strategy. Carranza could not miss the implication 
of his own deficiencies in the art of war. This 
justification did not make matters better. Yet the 
situation had been deteriorating since the rejection of the 
/ 25 
"Pact of Torreon". 
On July 15, 1914, Victoriano Huerta resigned as 
President of Mexico and fled the country. Relations between 
Villa and Carranza took a turn for the worse following the 
resignation. Villa insisted on many things following the 
withdrawal of Huerta. He demanded the disbandment of the 
federal army and the abolition of hacienda and mining 
stores. He desired that the power of the clergy be 
curtailed in fact as well as theory. Yet, relations with 
Carranza precluded him from pressing any demands. Since the 
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washout of the bridges linking him to the United States, 
Villa had to rely on Carranza for supplies. Coal, mined in 
Northern Coahuila, and some ammunition did come from 
Carranza for a short time, but after the failed conference 
at Torreon they stopped. Rumors began to circulate that 
relations between Villa and Carranza were moving to a 
26 
critical point. 
Carothers discounted the rumors. In a telegram to the 
Special Agent, Villa wrote: "I beg to state that my greatest 
hope is to see peace restored in Mexico . . . that all my 
vigilance and hardships are towards that only and supreme 
27 
end, the happiness of my country." Villa told Carothers 
that he would remain loyal to Carranza and would accept 
anything but isolation. But isolation constituted 
Carranza*s goal with respect to Villa. Villa enraged 
Carranza further in a matter dealing with constitutionalist 
money. The ease of counterfeiting villista currency forced 
Carranza to order Villa to call in the old issue currency of 
five million pesos and replace it with a better bill. Villa 
did issue the new bills but only certified the old issue and 
kept it in use. Thus ten million villista dollars were in 
circulation rather then just five. On July 20, Villa 
returned to Ciudad Juarez for one reason - to get 
28 
ammunition. 
Villa spent the rest of July resupplying and rebuilding 
his army. Mexican women smuggled 1000 rounds of ammunition 
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under their dresses from El Paso in the evening hours 
because there were no woman border guards after 6:00 p.m. 
and could thus avoid a body search. They received five 
pesos villista currency per trip. Villa scoured the 
countryside for men and horses. On July 21, the El Paso 
Herald reported that Villa had contracted to sell 50,000 
head of Terrazas cattle to J. E. Garrett of Corpus Christi, 
Texas. In order to keep Luis Terrazas* lawyers from blocking 
the sale, Terrazas received thirty percent of the sale. 
Since cattle sold for fifteen dollars a head, Villa stood to 
make 500,000 dollars. As Consul Marion Letcher reported, 
29 
"Nobody here doubts the purpose of his activity." Villa 
30 
wanted to buy guns. 
The Los Angeles Times reported on July 21, that 
villista agents had contracted for 260,000 dollars of guns 
and ammunition in Los Angeles. On July 30, the El Paso 
Herald reported that 300 new rifles were seen in Juarez, 
still in the sacking used to smuggle them across the Rio 
Grande. The army that Villa created became the largest 
native military group that ever fought in Mexico. Zachary 
Cobb, collector of Customs at El Paso, Texas, reported that 
Villa had nearly 50,000 men under arms stretching from 
Ciudad Juarez to Aguascalientes. Canova viewed the situation 
with misgivings. He believed that the trouble between Villa 
and Carranza had never been solved. He thought that the two 
million rounds that Villa ordered and due to arrive at 
- 123 -
Tampico would help clear the atmosphere. Carranza dashed 
this hope when he ordered the ammunition consigned to Villa 
held up at Tampico. This was the first time that Carranza 
gave notice to Villa's military build-up. He had spent the 
31 
balance of July negotiating the surrender of Mexico City. 
When Huerta resigned on July 15, Francisco Carbajal, 
former head of the Supreme Court, became president. On July 
23, Carranza received a message from a confidential agent in 
Mexico City for the first time in seventeen monthes. This 
signified Carbajal's willingness to enter into negotiations 
for the surrender of the city. He appointed two delegates 
to meet with Carranza to discuss terms for transfer of 
power. Carranza met personally with the delegates and 
informed them that the surrender must be unconditional. By 
August 1, negotiations still continued, but it was clear 
that Carranza would control the capital of Mexico shortly 
and that the Constitutionalist rebellion had reached a 
successful conclusion. Yet the unity of the rebel forces 
32 
also had come to an end. 
The month of June 1914 became the decisive month for 
the rebel factions. Carranza's decision to contain Villa's 
influence to the north had been instituted. Carranza 
believed that by diverting Villa to Saltillo he would 
contain him north of Torreon. What Carranza did not count on 
was Villa's quick victory at the capital of Coahuila. 
Carranza also hoped that Panfilo Natera could defeat the 
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federales at Zacatecas. Yet as opposed to Saltillo, he 
counted on an easy victory. Villa's resignation of the 
command of the Division del Norte brought only momentary joy 
to the First Chief. Here he did not take into account the 
attitude of Villa's subordinates. At every juncture during 
this critical period, Carranza miscalculated. In the 
process he achieved the split that had been building since 
February of that year. Instead of trying to heal the breach 
in the months of August and September, Carranza permanently 
opened the split and sent Mexico down the road to civil 
war. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A Criminal Situation 
"This situation is criminal, Mr. Canova, for everything 
possible should be done by both sides to avoid further 
revolution," said General Alvaro Obregon three days after 
Pancho Villa withdrew recognition from and denounced 
Venustiano Carranza as First Chief of the Constitutionalist 
1 
forces. On September 22, 1914, Villa told Carranza that he 
could no longer support the latter's position as dictator of 
Mexico. Villa arrived at this decision from a variety of 
sources. The fact that Carranza had not assumed the 
position as interim president but only took on the executive 
powers in an extra-legal fashion raised Villa's concerns. 
That, followed by Carranza's blocking Villa's 
representatives from attending the Conference of Generals in 
Mexico City, forced Villa to conclude that Carranza wanted 
to deny Villa and the Division del Norte a voice in the 
restoration of Mexico. The revolutionary coalition, as in 
2 
1912, began to fly apart. 
With the controversy over the Zacatecas campaign the 
developing split between Pancho Villa and Venustiano 
Carranza arrived. Yet it did not lead immediately to open 
warfare nor denounciation of Carranza by Villa. Efforts 
toward healing the breach were attempted by those 
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surrounding Carranza; but he was unwilling to make any 
concessions to Villa. Alvaro Obregon assumed the role as 
negotiator in this crucial period and held the balance of 
power. His decision to support Carranza and oppose Villa 
decided the outcome of the military phase of the split. The 
first active result of the discord occurred in Sonora 
between Governor Jose Maria Maytorena, a villista supporter, 
and the forces loyal to General Alvaro Obregon. A struggle 
for control of the state forced Obregon to request that he 
and Villa go to Sonora to attempt reconciliation between the 
opposing factions. A temporary truce resulted, but with the 
two generals in Chihuahua it fell apart and, with it, the 
last hopes of unity. By the middle of September Villa had 
had enough of Carranza's political maneuverings and declared 
himself in opposition to the First Chief. At this point 
Obregon moved to attempt reconciliation, and the result was 
the convention of Aguascalientes. Yet the convention did not 
heal the breach and by early 1915, the two factions moved 
toward armed conflict and the bloodiest phase of the Mexican 
Revolution. 
Fighting between the federales and the 
Constitutionalists continued into the month of August. 
Carranza agreed to meet with Francisco Carbajal's 
representatives, provided that they be prepared to surrender 
unconditionally. The representatives brought a variety of 
conditions. Most importantly, Carbajal wanted the congress 
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dissolved by Huerta reinstated so that he could resign his 
position to that body. Carbajal also requested that the 
congress issue amnesty to the Federal military officers, 
with the latter retaining their respective ranks. 
Carranza's unwillingness to discuss conditions brought the 
conference to a standstill. Carbajal countered that he 
would be willing to waive all other conditions but amnesty 
and guarantee of property. Carranza again refused to 
3 
discuss conditions and negotiations stalled. 
By August 9, 1914, Obregon had closed the distance 
between his army and Mexico City. On that date he sent 
formal notice to the federal army that either they surrender 
or prepare to fight. This prompted the federal army and 
government to make plans to evacuate the city. The next day 
Carranza arrived at Obregon*s camp outside Mexico City to 
meet with General Jose Refugio Villasco to discuss the 
surrender. He also contacted the Brazilian Minister to 
Mexico to make preparations to enter the city by force. On 
the twelfth, Carbajal dissolved his government and fled to 
Veracruz. The Governor of the Federal District, Eduardo 
Iturbide, assumed control and prepared to hand the city over 
/ 4 
to Obregon. 
Upon entering Mexico City, Obregon disbanded the 
Federal Army. He stripped the federales of their weapons and 
ordered the naval vessels to put into port. Carranza 
entered the Government Palace for the first time on August 
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20. Yet, along the route the First Chief encountered a 
lackluster show of enthusiasm. The next day he notified the 
State Governors and other federal authorities that he had 
assumed the executive powers, but did not signify in what 
capacity. He made one other move upon his entrance into 
Mexico City. He cut off the means to get to the capital from 
Zacatecas, and Pancho Villa, by tearing up the railroad 
tracks between Aguascalientes and Mexico City. Carranza 
decided to continue his policy of containing Villa to the 
north and did not invite the army most responsible for the 
defeat of Huerta to join in the triumphal march through the 
capital. This obvious affront to Villa and those under his 
command did nothing to settle conditions between the two 
men. It cut at the heart of Villa's honor. As the "Centaur 
of the North" continued to build his army, Carranza dealt 
5 
with problems concerning Mexico City. 
With the arrival of the rebel troops to Mexico City, 
conditions began to decline. Soldiers reported that they 
had been promised loot upon the capture of the city and this 
brought them into conflict with the civil authorities. The 
revolutionary soldiers resented the police and on August 26, 
a group of soldiers arrested two on-duty policemen. The 
soldiers killed one of the civil servants. Pitched battles 
between the police and rebels commenced, and by the 
twenty-ninth, as many as forty casualties were reported. 
Obregon responded by shutting down all civilian tribunals 
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and thus suspending protection of legal rights. This put 
the city under martial law and allowed for the commencement 
of looting. Carranza had trouble in Mexico City, but, more 
importantly, trouble in Sonora had reached a critical 
6 
point. 
The problem in Sonora began with the opening of the 
Constitutionalist rebellion. When Governor Maytorena 
requested sick leave in February 1913, control of the State 
passed to Obregon as military commander. Maytorena*s return 
was sure to bring conflict. He returned in July 1913 when 
the Constitutionalists had certain control of the state. 
Carranza approved of his return because Maytorena had been 
elected governor of the state under Madero, as the First 
Chief had been in Coahuila. At the end of May, 1914, reports 
of fighting between Maytorena and Military Governor, Colonel 
Plutarco Elias Calles became widespread. Maytorena had 
dissloved the state legislature upon his return because of a 
resolution demanding the governor's resignation. Calles, a 
supporter of Alvaro Obregon, and others called for state 
legislative elections to end the dictatorship. Yet by the 
second week of June, the trouble had been minimized. 
Obregon appointed General Salvador Alvarado to replace 
Calles as Military Governor and Maytorena was persuaded to 
disband his troops. The truce lasted until Huerta's fall 
7 
from power. 
As Carranza prepared to occupy Mexico City, Maytorena 
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and Calles again began to contest for control of Sonora. On 
August 10, the forces of Maytorena began to move north from 
Hermosillo toward Santa Ana and Cananea, garrisoned by the 
forces loyal to Calles. This situation preoccupied the 
United States' State Department. On the eleventh, Secretary 
Bryan ordered the United States Consul in Monterrey to 
confer with Carranza and point out the seriousness of the 
situation. Calles responded to Maytorena's moves by 
stationing a small garrison at Santa Ana and moved the bulk 
of his troops to Nogales. On the thirteenth, Maytorena 
ordered the arrest of General Alvarado and took him to 
Hermosillo. The factionalization of the Constitutionalist 
8 
forces had begun. 
As the situation deteriorated, Bryan became more 
concerned. On August 13, Bryan ordered Carothers to urge 
Villa to lessen tensions because it was the Secretary's 
impression that Villa had considerable influence over 
Maytorena. On August 22, Villa telegraphed Carranza and 
asked if the latter would send Obregon north so the two 
generals could confer with Maytorena and try to stop the 
fighting in Sonora. Villa's request to meet with Obregon 
showed that he was willing to keep the Constitutionalist 
factions together even though it would hurt him in the eyes 
of his Sonoran allies. Carranza granted Villa's request and 
9 
Obregon arrived in Chihuahua on August 24. 
On August 26, Villa and Obregon reached Ciudad Juarez 
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on their way to Sonora. The rail route through the United 
States to Nogales, Sonora, was the fastest and the two 
generals did not have Carranza's theatrical paranoia about 
leaving the country. Villista officials in Juarez arranged 
the trip through the good offices of El Paso Collector of 
Customs, Zachary Cobb, and General John Pershing. The good 
feeling between Villa and Obregon on their trip north seemed 
to cement relations between Villa and Carranza. As Cobb 
expressed it, the openness between the followers of Villa 
and Carranza "... has put a wet blanket completely over 
the inspired and heretofore too persistent talk of a 
10 
probable open breach between Carranza and Villa." The 
meeting between Obregon, Villa, and Maytorena began on 
August 29. They quickly worked out a compromise that put 
Maytorena and Obregon in full command in civilian and 
military matters respectively. Maytorena was allowed to 
keep the forces under his command, but Calles' troops passed 
to General Benjamin Hill. All troops were ordered to remain 
in place. Juan Cabral replaced General Alvarado as military 
Governor while Maytorena remained civilian governor. With 
the compromise complete, Villa and Obregon returned to 
11 
Chihuahua. 
The harmony between Villa and Obregon continued when 
the two successful generals reached Chihuahua. On Sept'ember 
3, they hammered out a nine point program for the direction 
Mexico should now take. Canova believed that Villa would 
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make certain demands on Carranza and if they were not 
accepted, another revolution was probable. The nine-point 
program constituted Villa's demands. The first issue 
concerned Carranza position as executive. Villa and Obregon 
wanted Carranza to assume the title of interim president. 
This had a dual purpose. First it would end the extra-legal 
period, and second, it would disqualify Carranza for 
election as constitutionalist president. The second point 
in the program also dealt with the extra-legal state of the 
current situation. Carranza would as soon as possible 
appoint federal judges to reestablish a civilian judiciary. 
The military tribunals would thus cease to exist in civilian 
matters. The third point had the respective civil or 
military governors of the states recognizing the authority 
of the new magistrates. The fourth point would end the 
extra-legal period by calling for local elections which 
would be authorized by the newly appointed magistrates. 
These four points envisioned the end of Carranza's position 
outside the constitution, the remaining five dealt with 
12 
revisions of the constitution. 
The fifth point called for election of state governors 
to replace military governors where applicable. Thus 
Maytorena and Carranza would retain their positions in 
Sonora and Coahuila respectively. The sixth point 
eliminated the office of vice-president. This position 
became a part of the Mexican political system during the 
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porfiriato and did not constitute a part of the original 
constitution of 1857. The call for elections for 
constitutional president, following the completion of the 
above points, constituted the seventh point. The eight 
point in the program disqualified all provisional officials 
from running for permanent positions. The ninth point dealt 
with the agrarian reform issue. Villa and Obregon called on 
Carranza to have the interim governors designate 
representatives to meet in Mexico City to study and make 
suggestions for resolution of the agrarian problem. The 
program did not ask for anything too radical and seemed to 
be consistent with the Plan de Guadalupe. Once finished, 
Obregon prepared to return to Mexico City. The problem with 
the program, like the Pact of Torreon, revolved around its 
13 
acceptance or rejection. 
Obregon delivered the nine point protocol on September 
7. Carranza did not respond until September 13, and stated 
that the questions addressed could not be answered by so 
small a group of men, meaning Villa, Obregon, and Carranza. 
The First Chief agreed to the first point, but his reply 
stated that all the points must be taken up at the 
conference of generals he had called to take place in Mexico 
City on or around October 1. On September 4, Carranza 
invited Villa to the convention in his position as military 
governor of Chihuahua. Villa replied that the sentiment of 
the generals of the Division del Norte was against the 
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convention. Villa wrote that it was true that the Pact of 
Torreon proposed the convention but since it was not a part 
of the Plan de Guadalupe he believed that it should not 
meet. Villa believed that the most important thing to be 
done was to establish a provisional government to restore 
order. Furthermore, he felt that the convention would 
subjugate the agrarian issue to lesser problems. Further 
events in Sonora ultimately changed Villa's attitude towards 
/ 14 
the convention and brought Obregon back to Chihuahua. 
The Sonoran accord broke down in the second week of 
September. Calles did not fulfill his end of the compromise 
and armed struggle broke out again. This forced Obregon's 
return to Chihuahua on the thirteenth, the same day that 
Carranza rejected the Villa-Obregon protocol. Obregon 
returned to Chihuahua believing that war with Villa was 
inevitable and hoped to use the meeting to wean away some of 
Villa's troops. On the sixteenth, Mexican Independence day, 
Villa treated Obregon to a review of the troops in 
Chihuahua. Villa had 19,000 well equipped troops parade past 
him and Obregon. Obregon, in return, planned a dance for the 
officers of the Division del Norte for the next evening. 
Yet further troubles in Sonora almost cancelled the 
15 
dance—and Obregon's life. 
On the seventeenth Villa and Obregon were discussing 
the Sonoran problem when a telegram arrived informing the 
former that a bridge near Nogales was burned by the forces 
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of General Hill. While in Chihuahua, Obregon had ordered 
Hill to leave Sonora, but the latter stayed because he 
believed the order had come under pressure from Villa. Villa 
flew into a rage. He told Obregon that he was going to kill 
him for not ordering Hill to leave Sonora. A squad of 
soldiers surrounded the house where the two men argued, 
ready to carry out Villa's orders. Canova overheard part of 
the argument since he was outside the room waiting to see 
Villa. He heard Villa raging over Hill's presence in Sonora. 
Canova quickly left because he did not want to appear to be 
eavesdropping. When Villa reached the height of his fury, 
Obregon reportedly said: "Since I gave my life to the 
service of the revolution I consider it will be fortunate 
16 
for me to lose it." Villa then left the room. He returned 
a hour later and told Obregon that he was not going to kill 
him. He told the Sonoran to come to the dance with him, 
calling him companerito, (little buddy) and they stayed at 
the dance until all hours of the morning. Yet Obregon's 
life remained at risk. Carranza's actions assured the 
17 
uncertainty of Obregon's survival. 
As late as September 21, Villa still had not accepted 
the invitation to the generals conference in Mexico City. 
Yet later in the day Obregon convinced him that his absence 
from the conference would allow Carranza to dominate it. 
Thus Villa decide to send representatives to Mexico City 
accompanied by Obregon. A special train left Chihuahua at 
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midnight of the twenty-first for the capital. Yet when the 
train reached Torreon it could go no further because 
Carranza had closed the road to Mexico City. Villa believed 
that Carranza wanted to keep him from attending the 
conference and decided to renounce his recognition of 
Carranza. He informed Carranza of his decision and the next 
day Villa told the people of Chihuahua: "We have decided to 
fight only against the personality of Venustiano 
18 
Carranza." Maytorena responded by announcing his 
19 
opposition to Carranza on the twenty-third. 
Villa and his staff immediately began to prepare a 
"Manifesto to the Mexican People" stating his reasons for 
denouncing Carranza as First Chief. On September 25, Canova 
saw a copy of the rough draft. The "Manifesto" began by 
arguing that the provisions of the Plan de Guadalupe were 
not being carried out. Carranza refused to assume the 
position of interim president as promised by the Plan. The 
armies of the North and Northeast had reached a compromise 
in Torreon but Carranza refused to accept it. The same 
compromise agreed to a convention to meet in Mexico City, 
but Carranza stopped traffic from the north by destroying 
the railroad tracks out of Aguascalientes, cutting off 
villista delegates from attending. With these affronts to 
Villa and the Mexican people, the "Manifesto" invited all 
Mexicans to withdraw recognition from Carranza, to join 
Villa in removing the executive power from the former First 
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Chief, and once the first two conditions were met, to 
appoint a civilian interim president. Villa released the 
final draft of the "Manifesto" on September 29, and Carranza 
20 
immediately responded to the charges. 
Carranza's reply consisted of seven points. First he 
stated that his only desire was to pass on the executive 
power as soon as possible. Second, only the revolutionary 
chiefs could receive the power he was willing to 
relinquish. Third, the convention of Generals should be the 
depository of the executive power. Fourth, all factions 
needed to be represented at the convention. Carranza 
believed that the first duty of the convention was to ask 
for Villa's resignation, and that constituted the fifth 
point. The sixth point stated Carranza's willingness to 
retire if the convention allowed it. Seventh, Carranza 
charged that Villa represented the voice of reaction and 
thus the people of Mexico should oppose the former bandit. 
Yet all this occured after Carranza cut off the route south 
21 
and stranded Obregon in villista territory. 
The train carrying Obregon and Villa's representatives 
returned to Chihuahua on the twenty-third, with Obregon 
still not out of danger. The day before Canova met with 
Villa to see when he was going to let Obregon return to the 
capital. Canova told Villa that it would be wise to let the 
Sonoran return to Mexico City because the latter could use 
his influence on the First Chief. Canova believed that Villa 
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would not execute Obregon unless Carranza once again 
inflamed him. Villa then told the special agent that 
Obregon would be leaving that day. Unknown to Canova, Villa 
intended to have Obregon killed enroute to Mexico City. 
Villa sent General Aguirre Benavides an order to stop the 
train and shoot the Sonoran. Obregon's chief of Staff told 
Canova that he did not know what Villa intended for them but 
they were ready to die for the good of the country. As for 
Obregon, he was more despondent over the prospect of another 
revolution then his own fate. But when Aguirre Benavides 
stopped the train enroute south, he and General Jose Isabel 
Robles decided to let it continue without carrying out 
Villa's orders. Obregon reached the relative safety of 
Zacatecas on the twenty-fourth and returned to the capital 
two days later. But the dispute with Villa was not 
22 
Carranza's only problem in September. 
The agrarian revolt of Emiliano Zapata had continued 
throughout Huerta's reign. Constantly harassing the suburbs 
of Mexico City, Zapata never had the organization to drive 
very far into the city. When Huerta resigned, the federales 
continued to block the Zapatista entrance into the capital. 
Rumors circulated that Carranza compromised with the 
federales in order to keep the Zapatistas out of the city 
until the Constitutionalist armies could occupy it. Early 
in September, carrancista agents contacted agents of Zapata 
hoping to bring the Morelos rebel into the Constitutionalist 
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camp. Zapata put three conditions on further negotiations 
with the carrancistas. First, Carranza had to accept the 
Plan de Ayala apropos of agrarian matters. Second, 
Zapatista representatives must share executive power with 
Carranza. Third, Carranza would have to meet with Zapata in 
Zapatista territory. Carranza's refusal to accept these 
conditions cut off any hope for an alliance with Zapata. Yet 
Carranza's agents saw villista agents there and they were 
well received. This, though, did not change the First 
Chief's attitude, and he cut off all ties to the Morelos 
23 
revolutionary. 
Carranza now found himself with adversaries on two 
fronts. When Villa withdrew recognition from Carranza he 
sent a telegram to Durango telling the Arrieta brothers of 
his decision and demanded that they declare one way or 
another. Villa needed to know where they placed their 
loyalty because they would constitute a threat to his line 
of supply if they opposed him. They did, and Villa 
responded by ordering the forces of Calixto Contreras to 
drive the Arrietas from the city of Durango. Once this had 
been accomplished, Villa moved south into Zacatecas and 
extended his control of north-central Mexico from Ciudad 
Juarez to a position nearer the capital. Obregon, upon 
arriving in Mexico City realized that something had to be 
done and agreed to meet with villista representatives in the 
neutral city of Aguascalientes. On the thirtieth, Obregon 
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informed Carranza that a compromise was reached for all the 
factions of the revolution to meet on October 10, in 
Aguascalientes. But first the carrancistas had to meet in 
Mexico City and approve of the decision, and Obregon quickly 
returned to the capital to ensure acceptance of the 
24 
decision. 
Two orders of business concerned the five day 
convention in Mexico City: Carranza's resignation and moving 
the covention to Aguascalientes. Carranza offered to resign 
his control of the executive power but since the convention 
was made up of only carrancista delegates the First Chief 
knew that he had nothing to worry about. The convention 
unanimously rejected Carranza's resignation. Then the 
question of moving the convention to Aguascalientes was 
discussed. Obregon believed that only this change in 
locations could stop continued civil war. He convinced the 
assembly and they voted to send delegates to Aguascalientes 
based on the formula in the Pact of Torreon. The delegates 
then adjourned the meeting, agreeing to meet on October 
25 
10. 
The convention of Aguascalientes contained considerable 
excitement but little substance. Yet all factions were 
represented and all made an honest attempt to solve the 
problems of factionalism in Mexico. Because the Zapatistas 
were not originally represented when the convention opened, 
a commission headed by Felipe Angeles went to Morelos to 
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invite Zapata to send representatives. On October 21, the 
convention received a message from Angeles stating that 
Zapata had accepted and would send a delegation. An 
advanced delegation arrived on the twenty-seventh headed by 
Antonio D^az Soto y Gama who immediately added some 
fireworks to the convention. His address to the convention 
began by stating that the representatives should not be 
constitutionalists, Zapatistas or villistas, but Mexicans. 
He then grabbed the Mexican flag that all the delegates had 
signed upon arriving and said that the flag represented the 
triumph of reaction. He said: "The Mexican people respect 
that standard and so do I. But let's not bring it here so 
that that rag can cover up certain political maneuvering . . 
26 
. " Boos and hisses, punctuated by the sound of pistols 
and rifles being unlimbered and cocked, greeted Dxaz Soto y 
Gama's reference to "that rag." Yet before being shot by 
the enraged convention, Diaz Soto y Gama talked himself out 
of his hole and the delegates began to discuss the agrarian 
reform platform that the Zapatistas representatives 
27 
presented. 
Villa's representative, Roque Gonzales Garza, began to 
speak of his support of the agrarian principles in the Plan 
de Ayala. Obregon then questioned whether Gonzalez Garza 
spoke for himself or for the entire Division del Norte. 
Gonzalez Garza responded that he would amply address the 
question by asking those from the Division del Norte who 
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supported the Plan de Ayala to stand. The whole delegation 
stood. Then he asked that those of the entire convention 
that supported the Plan to stand up. Some did, but many 
replied that they had not read it or could not read, a 
situation that was common, including some among the villista 
delegation. Without reaching a consensus the convention 
moved on to the question of the size of the Zapatista 
delegation. The Zapatistas said that they had 60,000 men 
under arms and requested that they be allowed 60 
representatives. Obregon responded that at most they had 
26,000 men, and if they did have more why had they been 
28 
unable to capture Mexico City. Again nothing was decided. 
On October 29-30, the convention took up the matter of 
Villa's and Carranza's position within the convention. 
Carranza received an invition to join the convention as a 
delegate but refused because, he responded, he was the First 
Chief and considered a lesser title beneath him. He also 
sent the convention his conditions for resigning his 
position as holder of the executive power. He asked the 
convention to establish a pre-constitutional government to 
carry out the reforms the country desperately needed and 
demanded that Villa renounce any candidacy for president or 
vice-president and resign his position as commander of the 
Division del Norte. He wanted Zapata to retire also and 
surrender the allegiance of those forces that recognized him 
as their leader. If these conditions were met, Carranza 
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would resign. Villa resigned his position but not his 
29 
control, and the situation began to crumble. 
Throughout the first month of the convention Obregon 
acted as the moderator between the villista and carranzista 
factions. Yet by early November he came to realize that 
Villa had too much control of the proceedings. When the 
convention ordered Carranza to surrender his position, after 
electing General Eulalio Gutierrez as provisional president 
of Mexico, Carranza refused and was declared in rebellion to 
the convention on November 10, 1914. Obregon wired Gutierrez 
that if the interim president dismissed Villa from his post 
as commander of the Division del Norte then he would adhere 
to the convention government; if not, he would fight against 
it. Gutierrez responded that he considered Carranza in 
rebellion and had restored Villa to his former position. 
The last attempt at compromise had failed, the carrancistas 
left the convention, Carranza fled Mexico City, and the 
Convention government took over the capital. In January of 
1915, Gutierrez sick of the political purges in Mexico City 
and his inability to control either Villa or Zapata, fled 
the Capital and faded from the scene. Nothing was left but 
30 
civil war. 
Two factors that occured in August and September of 
1914 contributed to Villa's ultimate defeat at the hands of 
Obregon at the two battles of Celaya, April 6-7, and 13-15, 
1915, which effectively destroyed him as a force in Mexico. 
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The first concerned the outbreak of World War I in August 
1914. Obregon studied the results of the battles and learned 
the effectiveness of barbed wire, entrenchments, and the 
machine gun. He realized that Villa knew only one strategy 
for war, charge. At the first battle, Obregon1s well 
entrenched forces repulsed Villa's cavalry charge. The 
second battle saw Obregon encircle the town with barbed 
wire, trenches and machine guns. Keeping a cavalry reserve 
of 7,000 men to counterattack when Villa exhausted his men 
and ammunition, Obregon destroyed Villa's reputation as 
unbeatable and routed his army with the counter attack. 
Villa's army never again achieved the power it had in early 
31 
1915. 
Yet more importantly, Carranza's recovery of Veracruz 
from the United States gave him and his generals a base of 
operations. The United States announced the intention of 
withdrawing from Veracruz in September, but political 
maneuvering delayed actual evacuation until November 23. 
Carranza quickly moved his government there following the 
evacuation of the United States forces and the Conventions 
entrance into Mexico City. Veracruz also gave the First 
Chief the necessary port to supply his army as well as the 
customs revenues to pay for his supplies. Villa's alliance 
with Zapata, effected in December of 1914, called for the 
Morelos revolutionary to drive the First Chief from that 
strategic position. But because it was so far from Zapata's 
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stronghold of the mountains of Morelos, he failed to uphold 
his end of the bargain. Obregon's victories at Celaya ended 
32 
Villa's role in the outcome of the Mexican revolution. 
The split between Villa and Carranza created by the 
circumstances surrounding the battle for Zacatecas was never 
repaired. Obregon tried to bring harmony between the two 
factions first in the State of Sonora and then at the 
convention of Aguascalientes, but Carranza had made his 
decision to exclude Villa from assisting in directing Mexico 
towards peace. He felt that if he could keep Villa in the 
north then his power could ultimately be curbed. He did not 
realize that Villa had the strength to oppose his control. 
As in the numerous occassions that Carranza had previously 
misjudged his opponent, the First Chief again did not 
realize that Villa had the strength to oppose his rule. 
Only by the good fortune to have Obregon side with him, did 
Carranza defeat Villa and maintain his control of Mexico. 
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Conclusion 
The most significant period in the Mexican Revolution 
of 1910-1920 came in the era of the Constitutionalist 
revolt. The separate groups from the states of Chihuahua, 
Sonora and Coahuila that joined together to oppose the rule 
of General Victoriano Huerta stayed together only as long as 
Huerta remained in power. Once he resigned, events that 
preceded and followed his tenure in power led to a 
factionalization of the Constitutionalist forces. 
The critical split came between Venustiano Carranza and 
Francisco "Pancho" Villa. Both men were a product of the 
porfiriato, the thirty-five year rule of Porfirio Diaz in 
which Mexico entered the modern world. Personality and 
social class separated these two men but both found 
themselves in the revolt to oust Diaz and then again against 
Huerta. Personality and the different goals each had for the 
revolution explained in large measure why the two factions 
ultimately engaged in bloody civil-war. This, however, does 
not provide the total answer fully. The addition of the 
actual events and the characters involved in said events 
further the understanding of the split. Since each was a 
product of the porfiriato, that becomes the logical place to 
begin the investigation. 
When Porfirio Diaz seized power in 1876, Mexico had 
just emerged from fifty years of political and social 
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turmoil. Diaz realized that in those fifty years Mexico had 
fallen behind the western world in development. He believed 
that if Mexico were to recoup and take its place in the 
modern world, development within the country needed to 
begin. Yet Mexico lacked the necessary investment capital. 
Thus he turned to foreigners to provide what Mexico could 
not. This meant that he needed to make Mexico attractive to 
foreign investors. The picture of Mexico in the 1870*s was 
of an unsafe land resulting from the years of political and 
social instability. Diaz immediately set out to change this 
image of Mexico. Using the army and a rural police force, 
Diaz successfully changed the picture of Mexico, while 
failing to change the reality. With the new view of a safe 
Mexico, he could then use other techniques to draw the 
capital necessary to modernize Mexico. 
Francisco Villa and Venustiano Carranza came of age in 
this period of modernization. Yet they viewed these changes 
from opposite directions. Carranza came from a well-to-do 
family and became intimately involved in the status quo. 
Serving the porfirian system from a variety of posts, he 
staked his future on the maintenance of that which he 
served. Villa was born a peon and at an early age turned to 
banditry. While the image of a bandit-free Mexico was 
portrayed to the world, in actuality only the main lines of 
transportation could boast of this freedom. While outside 
the porfirian system, Villa did not suffer the same 
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degradation that the majority of the Mexicans did. Never 
able to settle in one place for long periods, he still led a 
middle class existance. When political instability returned 
to Mexico in 1908-1909, each man profited from it. 
The rebellion instigated by Francisco I. Madero in 1910 
offered Villa legitimacy. The line between bandit and 
revolutionary was always very fine. When offered a chance 
to ally himself to a revolution against the system that had 
cast him beyond the pale, Villa joined gladly. He knew that 
if successful, the revolution could change him from outlaw 
to respected war veteran. Carranza's decision to support 
Madero in 1910 came from ambition and not from a desire to 
see an end to the system that he had supported his entire 
life. In the election for governor of his home state of 
Coahuila in 1908 porfirian support went to his opponent. 
Only when he had officially lost the election and Madero's 
rebellion showed signs of success did he throw his weight 
behind the revolt. With the overthrow of Diaz each achieved 
their desired ends. 
Villa, one of the leaders of the revolution, retired 
from active military service to the city of Chihuahua. No 
longer an outlaw, Villa finally married and settled down to 
an urban life. Carranza gained election to the office that 
the porfirians denied him. Yet each did not remain tied 
strictly to their new professions. A rebellion in northern 
Mexico under the banner of Pascual Orozco led Villa back 
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into military service. He offered his services to the 
Governor of Chihuahua, Abraham Gonzalez, the same man who 
was instrumental in getting Villa to join Madero. Gonzalez 
accepted but Villa did not serve out the entire campaign. 
Accused by the Federal Military Commander of Chihuahua, 
Victoriano Huerta, of insubordination, Villa barely escaped 
death only to go to jail, the one place he had, in the main, 
avoided throughout his career as an outlaw. Carranza too 
did not remain strictly tied to his new post. 
As governor of Coahuila, Madero's home state, Carranza 
failed to remain on good terms with the new president. A 
dispute with the federal government over monetary matters 
drove Carranza to contemplate rebellion. Gathering together 
representives of many northern governors in December of 
1912, Carranza tested his support for action against the 
Madero regime. Fate intervened before any action could be 
undertaken. A barracks revolt in Mexico City drove Madero 
from power and elevated General Victoriano Huerta to the 
presidency of Mexico. 
Victoriano Huerta played a variety of roles in the 
short presidency of Francisco Madero. A porfirian general of 
ability, Huerta helped crush the only major rebellion 
against Madero. The events of the Mexico City revolt forced 
Madero to turn to Huerta to lead the forces still loyal to 
the government. Yet a deal worked out under the direction 
of the United States Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane 
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Wilson, turned Huerta against Madero and thrust him into 
control of the country. The coup by Huerta may have been 
accepted by more people within Mexico as well as without had 
Madero not been murdered. The death of Madero, created a 
martyr and Huerta faced rebellion against his regime. 
The revolt against Huerta centered in the northern 
states of Sonora, Chihuahua and Coahuila. Each state had its 
own reasons for not recognizing Huerta as president of 
Mexico. Each had its own leaders, Villa in Chihuahua, 
Carranza in Coahuila, and Jose Maria Maytorena and Alvaro 
Obregon in Sonora. They all agreed to unite in common 
cause. Yet Villa and Carranza did not actually unite 
because Villa demanded that he retain control of all 
functions within Chihuahua while Carranza demanded overall 
control of the revolution. This difference of opinion in 
leadership was exacerbated by the socio-economic experiences 
of each man. Carranza viewed Villa as a lower-class bandit 
and treated him in a condescending manner. While Villa 
realized his inferiority towards those of the upper class, 
he reacted negatively to those that treated him as an 
inferior. Madero treated Villa as an equal and earned his 
respect, but Carranza did not follow this intelligent 
example. 
Besides this marked difference in social position, each 
man had a different goal for the revolution. Villa sought a 
true social revolution. He sympathized with the plight of 
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the lower-classes and realized their aspirations. Carranza, 
on the other hand, viewed political change as the major 
goal. He believed that the constitution that had been 
misused by D^az was still valid for Mexico. Only Diaz's 
misuse caused Mexico's problems. The restoration of that 
document would solve the problems created during the 
porfiriato. While these positions crystallized the reasons 
for the split between Villa and Carranza they do not explain 
the causes. Only the events of the Constitutionalist 
Revolution explain the actual causes of the factionalization 
of the Constitutionalist forces. 
The first event that heightened discontent between the 
two men came from international developments caused by the 
revolution. The foreign policy of the revolutionists, 
argued Carranza, was his domain. Yet Villa conducted his 
own foreign relations within the territory he controlled. 
Villa believed that the Spanish citizens living in Mexico 
supported Huerta and thus vented his rage against them. 
Carranza did support Villa publicly, in this instance, but 
privately undermined his position. Yet it took the death of 
William S. Benton, a British citizen to underscore the first 
real point of contention. 
Benton's death brought the United States directly into 
the events of the split. Forced by the British to intervene 
in the matter, the United States became intimately involved 
in the fortunes of the constitutionalist forces. Villa, 
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implicated in the death, knew that he must try to please the 
United States but, circumstances made that difficult. 
Ironically, Carranza came to Villa's defense by denying the 
northern government diplomatic discussions with Villa. Yet 
once the dispute was resolved, Villa informed the United 
States that if Carranza did not resolve diplomatic matters 
within villista-held territory, they could appeal to him. 
The events up to and including the Benton Affair showed 
Carranza that he must go to Chihuahua to attempt to control 
his nominal subordinate. 
Prior to Carranza's arrival in Chihuahua, two men 
joined Villa who would have an effect on the relations 
between Villa and Carranza. The first was George Carothers. 
Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, assigned 
Carothers, formerly Consul to Torreon, as special executive 
agent to Villa. Wilson hoped that Carothers could keep Villa 
from making the same type of mistake that he made in the 
Benton affair. In the long run Carothers was viewed as a 
Villa partisan by both the United States State Department 
and by Carranza. The other man to join Villa was General 
Felipe Angeles. Angeles was a former porfirian artillery 
officer who joined Carranza after Madero's overthrow. 
Carranza made Angeles sub-Secretary of War and granted 
Villa's request that Angeles join Villa's forces to direct 
his artillery. In the long run, Carranza would charge that 
Angeles was a agent for the reaction and directed Villa to 
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disobey Carranza's orders. Further discontent resulted from 
the Carranza-Villa meeting in Chihuahua. 
This first meeting since the Madero rebellion did more 
to drive the two men apart then any other event in the 
dispute. Villa thought that if he opened up to Carranza the 
two men could resolve any friction that had been generated 
between them. Yet Carranza at once treated Villa in the 
manner that most upset Villa and all hopes for harmony was 
lost. Yet the common enemy Huerta remained and a bargain 
was reached that allowed both factions to continue fighting 
the same foe. Another unlikely foe entered the fight 
against Huerta. 
Woodrow Wilson opposed the huertista government from 
its inception. A mistake by a Mexican Federal officer in 
the Mexican port of Tampico opened the door for active 
United States opposition to Huerta. Wilson's stated policy 
to "watch and wait" for the conclusion to the revolution 
took its only divergence. In April 1914, the armed forces 
of the United States occupied the Mexican port of Veracruz, 
cutting off Huerta's major supply depot and revenue source. 
But this attempt by the United States to assist the 
Constitutionalist revolt backfired when Carranza interpreted 
it as violation of Mexican sovereignty. He demanded that 
the United States withdraw their troops immediately. Villa 
refused to assume the same posture. He did not care if the 
United States controlled the port as long as the Americans 
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did not expand their control. In this instance, Carranza 
backed down and took up Villa's position. Yet Carranza had 
come to the conclusion that Villa could no longer be trusted 
and would try to contain the latter's control to the State 
of Chihuahua. 
In May of 1914, Villa's war machine had marched as far 
south as Torreon and began to make preparations for an 
attack on Zacatecas, the last strongpoint on the road to 
Mexico City. But Carranza, in his attempt to contain Villa 
in the north, ordered him east to attack Saltillo, the 
capital of Coahuila. Villa agreed and successfully drove the 
federals from that city. In the meantime Carranza assigned 
another general the attack on Zacatecas. But the Federales 
repulsed the attack on Zacatecas, and Carranza then ordered 
Villa to send reinforcements. Villa refused and in a six 
hour telegraphic conference resigned his position as leader 
of his division, which Carranza gleefully accepted. 
But Carranza did not gain what he wanted because 
Villa's subordinates would not allow their leader to 
resign. Instead they convinced Villa to ignore Carranza's 
orders and lead the division against Zacatecas. Villa's 
victory there in June of 1914, showed Huerta that his cause 
was hopeless and the latter resigned on July 15, 1914 and 
fled Mexico for Europe. Yet in the meantime Villa was unable 
to follow up his victory. Carranza stopped sending Villa 
the supplies he needed to move his army and Villa was 
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contained in the north. The split was now complete, yet 
further events would be necessary to confirm it. 
Villa spent the months of July and August increasing 
and supplying his army. Carranza spent his time accepting 
the surrender of Mexico City. When the triumphant rebels 
marched in victory through the capitol, Villa's troops were 
noticably absent. Carranza denied the force most 
responsible for Huerta*s defeat to join in the glory of 
victory, furthering the split between him and Villa. The 
final event to seal the split had its origins in the state 
of Sonora. 
The Governor of Sonora, Jose Maria Maytorena, and the 
forces of General Alvaro Obregon had been maneuvering for 
control of the state since May of 1914. Obregon had left the 
state in the hands of a military governor, Colonel Plutarco 
Elias Calles, as he fought his way down the western coast of 
Mexico. Governor Maytorena had taken sick leave at the time 
of Huerta's coup and his return to Sonora added a new force 
to the state. In a final attempt to heal the breach between 
Villa and Carranza as well as the breach in Sonora, Obregon 
went to Chihuahua to try to work out the Sonoran problem. A 
bargain was reached in Sonora, and Villa and Obregon 
hammered out an agreement that would reunite the forces of 
Villa and Carranza. Yet Carranza refused to honor the 
agreement and the truce in Sonora fell apart. On September 
22, 1914, Villa renounced his loyalty to Carranza. This 
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confirmed the split. 
One further attempt to bring the victorious factions 
under a single banner took place in Aguascalientes in the 
form of a convention of the military leaders. 
Representatives of all the factions, including those of 
Emiliano Zapata, met to decide the fate of Mexico. An 
interim president was elected and the course of the future 
was decided. But Carranza refused to acknowledge the 
sovereignty of the convention and Villa refused to 
acknowledge Carranza as leader. Only civil war remained. 
The most important period of the Mexican Revolution of 
1910-1920 came in the era of the Constitutionalist revolt. 
Once Victoriano Huerta was driven from power the revolution 
began to factionalize. The critical split came between 
Venustiano Carranza and Francisco "Pancho" Villa. Both men 
participated in the revolt against Dxaz and then became the 
leaders in the revolt against Huerta. The course of the 
revolution and the decisions each made regarding the other 
add the missing ingredient. All attempts to heal the breach 
failed because both men had reached the conclusion that the 
other was a danger to the country. While Villa caused many 
of the problems that finally brought about the split, his 
transgressions came out of ignorance. Carranza, on the 
other hand, actively plotted to exclude Villa from the 
decision making process. Carranza, with all his formal 
education, could not discard his prejudice against those of 
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the lower classes. He accepted them for cannon-fodder but 
refused to allow them a place in the post-revolutionary 
hierarchy. Thus Carranza must be assigned the major 
responsibility for the split. The significance of the split 
meant that the villistas would be excluded from making 
decisions on the reconstruction of Mexico. This did not 
materialize until December of 1916 with work on the new 
constitution but was clearly evident in September of 1914. 
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